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WARNING: A POST-SALE DUTY TO WARN TARGETS SMALL
MANUFACTURERS
Jill Wieber Lens∗
The majority of states now obligate manufacturers to warn about
dangers of their products that are discoverable after the sale.
Commentators and courts have been hesitant about this obligation
because of the potential burden it puts on manufacturers—the costs of
identifying users and warning them of the danger. The consensus is that
only a factually dependent post-sale duty to warn should exist, obligating
manufacturers to warn only if a reasonable manufacturer would do so. A
reasonable manufacturer, of course, would warn only if the danger to be
warned of justifies the costs of the warning.
This Article is the first to identify a problem with a factually
dependent post-sale duty to warn—it will most likely result in liability for
small manufacturers, but not large manufacturers. This is because the
costs of issuing the warning for a small manufacturer will always be
smaller than for a large manufacturer. This Article is also the first to
argue that a factually dependent post-sale duty to warn is inconsistent
with the underlying purposes of products liability law and general public
policy. Although the factually dependent post-sale duty to warn seems
like a perfect solution to the overburdening problem, courts should not
adopt it.
I. INTRODUCTION
If you want to see people squirm, we recommend that you gather
representatives from industry in a room and then flash the words “postsale warnings” on a screen. The reaction is guaranteed. The reason is
simple. It is one thing to tell a manufacturer that it has the duty to
provide an initial warning with the product. 1
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Schurmann (Baylor J.D. 2014), and Phil Segura (Baylor J.D. 2015) for their valuable
research assistance. Any mistakes are the Author’s.
1
JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, TEACHER’S MANUAL—
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 162 (7th ed. 2011).
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But it is another thing to tell manufacturers that they could owe a duty to warn
after they have sold the product—practically, a duty to identify users and warn
them of a newly materialized danger. As explained by the authors of the Third
Restatement of Torts: Products Liability (“Third Restatement”), it is a “monster
duty,” a “seemingly . . . timeless duty to warn.” 2
More than half of the states and the Third Restatement have adopted a postsale duty to warn. But this is not a reason for manufacturers to hide in fear—at
least not all of them. Most of these states have adopted a post-sale duty that is
factually dependent. The duty will exist only if a reasonable manufacturer would
have warned, which is true only if the costs of issuing the warning were
reasonable. The Third Restatement explains, and commentators agree, this
factually dependent inquiry is necessary to ensure a post-sale duty to warn does not
“impose unacceptable burdens on product” manufacturers. 3 Because the costs are
relevant, large manufacturers that distribute their products widely to a large
number of customers need not be worried. If issuing a warning would necessitate
identifying and contacting three million customers all spread across a region, no
duty would likely exist.
This Article is the first to explore a problem with the well-intentioned
factually dependent post-sale duty to warn—a problem that should make small
manufacturers squirm. Unlike a large manufacturer, a small manufacturer is likely
to have fewer customers located in a geographically distinct area. The small
manufacturer may even have continuing contact with those customers, and it
would not be very expensive for a small manufacturer to warn its customers. Thus,
a small manufacturer would owe a post-sale duty to warn and face liability for
failing to warn.
This type of factually dependent duty to warn—likely owed by small
manufacturers but not large manufacturers—is inconsistent with the underlying
theories of products liability. Those underlying theories support a broad post-sale
duty to warn, obligating all manufacturers, not just the small manufacturers. A
factually dependent post-sale duty to warn is also inconsistent with general public
policy. Small manufacturers are already especially vulnerable to the effects of
products liability law and have difficulty obtaining products liability insurance.
This difficulty will increase now that only small manufacturers face a new form of
liability for post-sale conduct.
Ultimately, a broad post-sale duty to warn could be very burdensome on
manufacturers because of the costs of warning. A factually dependent version of
the duty, however, likely protects only larger manufacturers from those costs. If
those costs are real and valid, the solution is to reject any post-sale duty to warn,
ensuring that all manufacturers are treated the same.
Part II of this Article explores the differences between the point-of-sale
warning obligation and a possible post-sale warning obligation. Part III uses case
2

Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 cmt. a (1998) [hereinafter
THIRD RESTATEMENT].
3
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law and the Third Restatement factors to explain how a factually dependent postsale duty to warn is more likely to create a post-sale warning obligation for small
manufacturers than for large manufacturers. Part IV argues that because of the
effect on small manufacturers, a factually dependent post-sale duty is inconsistent
with the theories underlying products liability law and with general public policy.
Part V concludes by arguing the courts should reject any post-sale duty to warn
that creates different obligations for different manufacturers. That likely means
that courts should reject any post-sale duty to warn.
II. WHAT IS A POST-SALE DUTY TO WARN?
The best way to understand a post-sale duty to warn is to compare it to the
well-accepted manufacturer’s point-of-sale duty to warn. 4
A. The Basics of a Point-of-Sale Warning
Manufacturers “have a duty to provide consumers with warnings of hidden
product dangers and instructions on how products may be safely used.” 5 The duty
is not to warn of all hidden dangers, however. Instead, the manufacturer is
obligated to warn of the foreseeable dangers—the dangers about which the
manufacturer knew or should have known at the time of sale. 6
Liability for failure to warn is based in negligence. 7 If a reasonable
manufacturer would have warned about the foreseeable dangers, a defendant is
4

This Article refers to the “manufacturer” instead of “seller.” The common law
obligates both manufacturers and sellers to warn. See id. § 1 cmt. e. At the same time,
“[l]egislation has been enacted in many jurisdictions that, to some extent, immunizes
nonmanufacturing sellers or distributors from strict liability.” Id. A seller would not likely
be liable for either a point-of-sale failure to warn or a post-sale failure to warn if it had no
involvement in the creation of the warning. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 82.003 (West 2011). Thus, I will refer only to the manufacturer as possibly owing a postsale duty to warn.
5
DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 9.1 (2d ed. 2008).
6
Richter v. Limax Int’l, Inc., 45 F.3d 1464, 1471 (10th Cir. 1995) (explaining that
manufacturers have a duty to warn of harms “reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer of
the product” and that “a manufacturer cannot be held liable for harm that no reasonable
person could anticipate”).
7
Some courts still pretend the standard is based in strict liability, but others admit a
“strict liability” failure to warn claim is no different than a negligent failure to warn claim.
See, e.g., Anguiano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 44 F.3d 806, 811–12 (9th Cir.
1995) (stating that “the question whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn under strict
liability depends on the standards for determining a duty to warn under a negligence
action”); Klem v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 19 F.3d 997, 1001–03 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that failure-to-warn claims in strict liability and in negligence duplicate one
another); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating that although
the negligence and strict liability theories may be phrased differently, the issue is generally
the same: “was the warning adequate?”); Sell v. Bertsch & Co., 577 F. Supp. 1393, 1397
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liable if it failed to act similarly. A defendant cannot be liable for failing to warn of
dangers that were unforeseeable at the time of the sale. Instead, a defendant can be
liable only if it was at fault. That is, it failed to warn about the foreseeable dangers,
the same dangers about which a reasonable manufacturer would warn.
It is still possible for liability for a failure to warn to be strict. That is how the
New Jersey Supreme Court defined the warning obligation in Beshada v. JohnsManville Products Corp. 8 There, the court affirmed liability for a manufacturer’s
failure to warn about the dangers of asbestos—dangers that, according to the
defendant’s allegations, were unknown to even the scientific community at the
time the product was sold. 9 The court defined a strict liability warning obligation,
and any argument that the defendant “could not have known the product was
dangerous” was irrelevant to a theory of strict liability. 10
But “American courts and commentators have widely (if not quite
universally) rejected this kind of ‘super-strict’ liability on grounds of fairness,
logic, and practicality.” 11 The main reason for the criticism of Beshada and the
rejection of strict liability for failure to warn is that strict liability would be too
harsh and unfair. Requiring warnings of unknowable risks is essentially requiring
the impossible. “A manufacturer cannot fairly be required to issue warnings at the
point of sale of dangers about which it did not know and could not have

(D. Kan. 1984) (“Under either theory, the duty to warn is one of ordinary care.”); Leesley
v. West, 518 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that where the issue regards a
manufacturer’s failure to warn, “the manufacturer’s duty is essentially the same under
either a negligence or [a] strict liability theory”); Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284,
289 (Iowa 1994) (“After reviewing the authorities and comments on the failure to warn
question, we believe any posited distinction between strict liability and negligence
principles is illusory.”); Crislip v. TCH Liquidating Co., 556 N.E.2d 1177, 1183 (Ohio
1990) (“[T]he standard imposed upon the defendant in a strict liability claim grounded
upon an inadequate warning is the same as that imposed in a negligence claim based upon
inadequate warning.”).
8
447 A.2d 539, 545 (N.J. 1982).
9
Id. at 546. There was a “substantial factual dispute about what defendants knew and
when they knew it.” Id. at 542. For purposes of resolving the defendants’ motion to
dismiss, though, the court assumed the defendants had a lack of knowledge. Id. at 543.
10
Id. at 546.
11
OWEN, supra note 5, § 9.2, at 592; THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 2 cmt. a
(explaining that the rationale for imposing strict liability does not apply to defects based on
inadequate instruction or warning). Even the New Jersey Supreme Court found differently
a few years later in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984). In
Feldman, the potentially defective products at issue were prescription drugs. Id. at 376–77.
And when prescription drugs were at issue, the court held that drug manufacturers were
obligated to warn only of “dangers of which they know or should have known on the basis
of reasonably obtainable or available knowledge” at the time of sale. Id. at 376. The New
Jersey Supreme Court also noted in Feldman that its decision in Beshada had been heavily
criticized. Id. at 387–88.
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known . . . .” 12 Thus, manufacturers are obligated to warn only of dangers about
which they knew or should have known at the time of sale.
Notably, the fault analysis for the point-of-sale warning obligation considers
what the defendant knew and what it should have known. The fault analysis does
not consider the costs of issuing a point-of-sale warning. That is because the costs
are negligible: “the cost of giving an adequate warning is usually so minimal,
amounting only to the expense of adding some more printing to a label.” 13
Obviously, the costs of the injury that result from the inadequate warning outweigh
“a few pennies for a bit more paper and a little more ink.” 14 Thus, a reasonable
manufacturer would always warn of the foreseeable dangers.
12

Victor Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road
to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 892, 896–97 (1983).
13
Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 15 (Md. 1975); see also Johnston v. United
States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 359–60 (D. Kan. 1983) (explaining that point-of-sale warnings
would be “trivial in cost”); Moran, 332 A.2d at 15 (discussing that balancing the costs of
adding a warning against the benefits resulting from that warning “will almost always
weigh in favor of an obligation to warn of latent dangers”); Wheeler v. Gen. Tire & Rubber
Co., 419 N.W.2d 331, 339 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that the cost of added point-ofsale warnings would have been “very small”); Paul D. Rheingold & Susan B. Feinglass,
Risk-Utility Analysis in the Failure to Warn Context, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 357
(1997) (explaining that the “suppliers’ costs of providing a warning” are
“always . . . negligible”).
Arguably, there are costs associated with issuing the point-of-sale warning. See James
A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The
Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 297 (1990) (arguing that “judges
and juries . . . assume erroneously that warnings are virtually costless”); see also Karin L.
Bohmholdt, Note, The Heeding Presumption and Its Application: Distinguishing No
Warning from Inadequate Warning, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 461, 477 (2003) (explaining that
“there are collateral costs associated with providing warnings” including the “costs
associated with lost profits from a product containing too many warnings or the costs
associated with ‘lost effect’ of an important warning among multiple, less necessary
ones”). If a product contains too many warnings, consumers may disregard them.
Henderson & Twerski, supra, at 296; see also Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prod. Co., 840 F.2d
935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“The inclusion of each extra item dilutes the punch of every
other item. Given short attention spans, items crowd each other out; they get lost in fine
print.”). Plus, there is a limit to how much information each warning can include. Id. (“If
every foreseeable possibility must be covered, ‘[t]he list of foolish practices warned against
would be so long, it would fill a volume.’” (quoting Kerr v. Koemm, 557 F. Supp. 283, 288
n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). “Even a court which knows, in the abstract, that a limit will
ultimately be reached, has no immediate sense of whether the case before it pushes the
warning package beyond the appropriate constraints.” Henderson & Twerski, supra, at 301.
It is difficult to argue these costs, however, because there is “no available body of hard
science from which to draw the data.” Id. at 298.
14
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 13, at 297; see also Ross Labs. v. Thies, 725
P.2d 1076, 1079 (Alaska 1986) (“The cost of giving an adequate warning is usually so
minimal, i.e., the expense of adding more printing to a label, that the balance must always
be struck in favor of the obligation to warn where there is a substantial danger which will
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B. The Basics of a Post-Sale Duty to Warn
A post-sale warning is a warning issued after the sale of the product. It
addresses dangers that the seller discovered, or should have discovered, after the
sale. These are most likely dangers that were unknowable at the time of sale—the
type of danger for which the defendant could not be liable for failing to warn at the
point-of-sale. But if the manufacturer discovers or should have discovered a danger
after the sale, a post-sale duty would obligate the manufacture to warn users,
possibly years after that sale, of that newly materialized danger.
To illustrate the difference, consider an illustration from the Third
Restatement:
ABC has manufactured and distributed vacuum cleaners commercially to
millions of consumers over the course of many years. . . . Five years after
the first commercial distribution of Model 14, ABC discovers a risk
when the Model 14 is used to vacuum dust from a chemical carpet
cleaner newly introduced to the market. No reasonable person in ABC’s
position would have foreseen the risk previously, and thus the Model 14
was not defective at time of original sale. 15

not be recognized by the ordinary user.”); OWEN, supra note 5, § 9.2, at 591 (explaining
that “the safety benefits of adding a sufficient warning virtually always exceed its monetary
costs”).
15
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. e, illus. 2. Courts that have adopted a
post-sale duty to warn differ regarding whether the later-discoverable danger (triggering
the need for a warning) must be related to a defect existing at the time of sale. Under the
Third Restatement version, a post-sale duty to warn exists “whether or not the product is
defective at the time of original sale.” Id. § 10 cmt. a. Many states, however, have required
that a latent and undetectable design defect exist at the time of sale for a manufacturer to
owe a duty to warn of the later revealed danger. Kenneth Ross, Post-Sale Duty to Warn: A
Critical Cause of Action, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 339, 347 (2000); see also DAVID G.
OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11.2, at 688 (3d. ed. 2000);
see, e.g., Romero v. Int’l Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444, 1450 (10th Cir. 1992) (limiting the
post-sale duty to warn to “defects in design, existing but unknown or unappreciated at the
time of the original sale, which are subsequently discovered by the manufacturer”); Patton
v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1313 (Kan. 1993) (recognizing a postsale duty to warn “when a defect, which originated at the time the product was
manufactured” is later discovered).
There is no obvious need for liability for a post-sale failure to warn if a design defect
also exists. Seemingly, the manufacturer would lack an incentive to issue a warning if the
product is defectively designed; later issuance of a warning would not negate liability for
the defective design. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. j. Still, issuing the
warning could be practically beneficial. If the user is warned, the user may be able to avoid
injury. Using the example in the accompanying text, the user may not use the vacuum
cleaner along with the chemical carpet cleaner. If the user is not injured, the manufacturer
cannot be liable despite the existence of a design defect. Alternatively, if the user operates
the vacuum cleaner with the chemical carpet cleaner despite being warned, the
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If a post-sale duty to warn existed, ABC would be obligated to warn its users
of the newly discovered risk. How exactly would ABC warn its users? Obviously,
the manufacturer cannot just “change the warning on the product,” 16 because the
product has already left the manufacturer’s control. 17
In order for ABC to warn its users of the newly materialized danger, it will
have to contact those users. “The manufacturer must try to locate the product,
identify its users, and advise them about the newly discovered product hazard.” 18
This will be difficult. The more customers, the more arduous this will be. It will be
even more difficult if the product has changed hands over time—if the original
purchaser has sold it or given it away. 19
“Even if the effort to identify and contact current product users is successful,
the cost of such an effort might be intolerable.” 20 The writers of the Third
Restatement agreed. They concluded that “an unbounded post-sale duty to warn
would impose unacceptable burdens on product sellers,” including undertaking the
“daunting” “costs of identifying and communicating with product users years after
sale.” 21 The serious potential for overburdening sellers is the reason Illinois courts
rejected a post-sale duty to warn: “the law does not contemplate placing the

manufacturer would have a basis for a comparative fault defense, reducing the plaintiff’s
recoverable damages.
Moreover, if the state requires a plaintiff to establish a point-of-sale design defect in
order to show a post-sale failure to warn, it will be impossible for a plaintiff to base a postsale duty to warn on a failure to disclose a danger not knowable until after sale. A design
defect exists under the risk-utility test only if “the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced” with an alternative design. Id. § 2(b). If the danger was
unknowable (and obviously unforeseeable) at the time of sale, no design defect exists.
Thus, if the danger was unknowable at the time of sale—and only later becomes
knowable—there can also be no liability for a post-sale failure to warn if the state also
requires a design defect.
Regardless of whether the defect must have existed at the time of manufacture, a postsale duty to warn is not owed simply because the manufacturer develops a safety
advancement. OWEN ET AL., supra, § 11.2, at 691.
16
Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Iowa 1999) (“[O]nce the product is
sold, a variety of circumstances can impede, if not make impossible, the ability of a
manufacturer to warn users.”); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 895 (“The warning cannot be
attached to the product because the product already has been sold.”).
17
Douglas R. Richmond, Expanding Products Liability: Manufacturers’ Post-Sale
Duties to Warn, Retrofit and Recall, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 7, 18 (1999) (“Post-sale failure-towarn claims are differentiated from point-of-sale failure-to-warn claims by a lack of
manufacturer control.”).
18
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 895–96; Richmond, supra note 17, at 19.
19
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 896; Richmond, supra note 17, at 19.
20
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 896.
21
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. a.
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onerous duty on manufacturers to subsequently warn all foreseeable users of
products” 22 of “defects first discovered after a product has left its control.” 23
Despite the potential for overburdening manufacturers, over half the states
have adopted a post-sale duty to warn and more are likely to follow given the
Third Restatement also includes a post-sale duty to warn. 24 Those states that have
22

Modelski v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 707 N.E.2d 239, 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
(quoting Collins v. Hyster Co., 529 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
23
Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co., 955 N.E.2d 1138, 1160 (Ill. 2011) (quoting Modelski,
707 N.E.2d at 247). Numerous other states have rejected the imposition of a post-sale duty
to warn including the following: Boatmen’s Trust Co., v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
995 F. Supp. 956, 962 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (Arkansas); Smith v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No.
Civ.A 94C-12-002JEB, 2002 WL 31814534, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2002)
(Delaware); Tober v. Graco Children’s Prods., Inc., 431 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir. 2005)
(Indiana); Wicker ex rel. Estate of Wicker v. Ford Motor Co., 393 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1235–
36 (W.D. Okla. 2005) (Oklahoma); Palmer v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 905 So. 2d 564,
600–01 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (Mississippi); Anderson v. Nissan Motor Co., 139 F.3d 599,
602 (8th Cir. 1998) (Nebraska); Campbell v. Gala Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A.6:04-2036-RBH,
2006 WL 1073796, at *4–5 (D.S.C. Apr. 20, 2006) (South Carolina); McLennan v. Am.
Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 430 (5th Cir. 2001) (Texas). Several other states and the
District of Columbia have not yet addressed whether to impose a general post-sale duty to
warn, including Alabama, California, D.C., Montana, Nevada, Rhode Island, Vermont,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. See KENNETH ROSS, AM. BAR ASS’N, POST-SALE DUTY TO
WARN: A REPORT OF THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY COMMITTEE 68, 72–73, 77, 106–07, 124–
25, 129–30, 134–37 (2004); Jacob R. Swiss, Delayed Discovery of Defect: Duty to Warn?,
USLAW, Spring/Summer 2014, at 10, 11.
24
The following states have adopted some sort of post-sale duty to warn: Wilson v.
U.S. Elevator Corp., 972 P.2d 235, 238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (Arizona); Downing v.
Overhead Door Corp., 707 P.2d 1027, 1032–34 (Colo. App. 1985) (Colorado); Densberger
v. United Techs. Corp., 297 F.3d 66, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2002) (Connecticut); Braniff Airways,
Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451, 453 (2d Cir. 1969) (Florida); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-1-11(c) (2000 & Supp. 2013) (Georgia); Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., 944 P.2d 1279,
1300 (Haw. 1997) (Hawaii); Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1313
(Kan. 1993) (Kansas); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.57(C) (2009) (Louisiana); OwensIllinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 643–46 (Md. 1992) (Maryland); Vassallo v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 923–24 (Mass. 1998) (Massachusetts); Comstock v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 99 N.W.2d 627, 634–35 (Mich. 1959) (Michigan); Hodder v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 833–34 (Minn. 1988) (Minnesota); Dixon v.
Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 637 A.2d 915, 922 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (New Jersey);
Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864, 871 (N.Y. 1984) (New York); Crowston v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401, 406–09 (N.D. 1994) (North Dakota); Temple v.
Wean United, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 267, 272–73 (Ohio 1997) (Ohio); Walton v. Avco Corp.,
610 A.2d 454, 459–60 (Pa. 1992) (Pennsylvania); Kozlowski v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co.,
275 N.W.2d 915, 923–25 (Wis. 1979) (Wisconsin).
The following states have adopted the Third Restatement’s post-sale duty or relied on
it: Jones v. Bowie Indus., Inc., 282 P.3d 316, 335 (Alaska 2012) (Alaska); Lovick v. WilRich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 693–96 (Iowa 1999) (Iowa); Jarrett v. Duro-Med Indus., No. 05102-JBC, 2007 WL 628146, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 26, 2007) (Kentucky); Hanlan v.
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adopted the duty have acknowledged the potential burden on manufacturers, as did
the Third Restatement, which stresses that courts consider the “serious potential for
overburdening sellers” when examining whether to impose the post-sale duty. 25
In order to protect manufacturers, the states that have adopted a post-sale duty
have adopted factually dependent versions—the duty will exist only when the facts
show the manufacturer would not be overburdened if forced to issue the post-sale
warning. 26 The Third Restatement similarly dictates that liability for a failure to
warn is proper only if a reasonable manufacturer would have issued the post-sale
warning. 27 Plainly, a reasonable manufacturer would have issued a warning only if
the costs of issuing that warning were reasonable. If the costs are unreasonable,
then liability is improper.
This is markedly different than the point-of-sale warning obligation. Certain
exceptions exist, 28 but generally, all manufacturers owe a duty to issue the pointof-sale warning. The fact finder then decides whether the manufacturer breached
that duty based on the factual circumstances. With the factually dependent postsale duty to warn, however, courts frequently declare that a specific manufacturer
Chandler, No. 4-0259B, 2008 WL 5608253, at *2–3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2008)
(Massachusetts); In re Mentor Corp. ObTape Transobturator Sling Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
2004 4:08-MD-2004 (CDL), 2013 WL 2421007, at *3 (M.D. Ga. June 3, 2013)
(Minnesota); Jenks v. Textron, Inc., No. 09-cv-205-JD, 2012 WL 2871686, at *2 (D.N.H.
July 10, 2012) (New Hampshire); Robinson v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 500 F.3d 691,
697–98 (8th Cir. 2007) (South Dakota); Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp., No. 2:99-CV00503DAK, 2008 WL 4250049, at *4–5 (D. Utah Sept. 9, 2008) (Utah); Rash v. Stryker
Corp., 589 F. Supp. 2d 733, 735–36 (W.D. Va. 2008) (Virginia); Daniel v. Coleman Co.,
599 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (Washington).
Additionally, “[b]y statute and by decisional law, the seller of prescription products
has always been held to have a continuing duty to advise governmental authorities of new
information regarding risk levels in use of his products, and to employ on an ongoing basis
their scientific and medical expertise to discover and advise health care professionals of
new hazard related information.” M. Stuart Madden, Modern Post-Sale Warnings and
Related Obligations, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 33, 39–40 (2000). This is not controversial
because drug manufacturers need only warn doctors, and it is not difficult to locate and
contact doctors.
25
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. a.
26
See, e.g., Robinson, 500 F.3d at 697–98 (applying South Dakota law and finding no
violation of the duty to warn where the long passage of time would make it unreasonable
for the manufacturer to locate all owners of its product and the manufacturer had already
conducted a reasonable “post-sale warning campaign”).
27
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10(a); see also Schwartz, supra note 12, at
896 (explaining that “cost should be considered in determining whether a manufacturer has
made a reasonable effort to warn product users” and that the “facts of a particular case . . .
should all be relevant in determining” liability for post-sale failure to warn).
28
For instance, manufacturers do not have to warn of “risks that are either obvious,
known to the affected party, or both.” OWEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 9.1, at 519. Similarly,
“there is no duty to give a warning to members of a trade or profession against dangers
generally known to that group.” Id. § 9.8, at 568. Exceptions to the duty to warn also exist
for sellers of bulk materials and raw materials. See generally id. § 9.9.
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does not even owe a duty to warn because of the factual circumstances. Similarly,
the Third Restatement’s post-sale duty to warn can be read as a rule where the duty
would not exist because of the factual circumstances. 29
A factually dependent post-sale duty to warn also differs from a point-of-sale
duty to warn in its consideration of costs. For the point-of-sale warning, the
consideration of fault is limited to whether the danger was foreseeable. A
29

Professor Aaron Twerski was one of the co-reporters of the Third Restatement of
Torts: Products Liability. In separate scholarship, Professor Twerski pointed to the postsale duty rule as an example of a no-duty rule that is dependent on the individualized facts
of the case as opposed to a categorical no-duty rule. See Aaron D. Twerski, The Cleaver,
the Violin, and the Scalpel: Duty and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1,
19–21 (2008). In addition, courts often rely on the facts to find that the defendant did not
owe a post-sale duty to warn. See, e.g., Lewis v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862, 867 (Mass.
2001) (finding no duty where the facts showed the plaintiff “purchased the product at least
second hand, sixteen years after it was originally sold, and did not own the product until
years after a duty to provide additional warnings arguably arose”). Professor Twerski made
his observation in criticizing the version of duty described in drafts of the Third
Restatement of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm, written by Professors Michael Green
and William Powers. See Twerski, supra, at 21–25. That version describes that “[n]o-duty
rules are appropriate only when a court can promulgate relatively clear, categorical, brightline rules of law applicable to a general class of cases.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 cmt. a (2010).
The language of Professor Twerski’s individualized facts no-duty rule in the Third
Restatement of Torts: Products Liability could also be interpreted as being consistent with
the brightline duty rules articulated in the Third Restatement of Torts: Liability for Physical
Harm. It could be read as obligating all manufacturers to issue post-sale warnings, a
brightline rule, but clarifying that no breach of that duty occurs if a reasonable
manufacturer would not have issued the post-sale warning. This is more consistent with
reasonableness’s traditional relevance to breach (and not to duty). Under this interpretation,
courts do not reject post-sale warning claims because the defendant did not owe a duty, but
because the unreasonableness of issuing a warning meant the defendant did not breach as a
matter of law. The Third Restatement of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm includes a
description of this:
Sometimes reasonable minds cannot differ about whether an actor
exercised reasonable care under § 8(b). In such cases, courts take the question of
negligence away from the jury and determine that the party was or was not
negligent as a matter of law. Courts sometimes inaptly express this result in
terms of duty. . . . In fact, these cases merely reflect the one-sidedness of the
facts bearing on negligence, and they should not be misunderstood as cases
involving exemption from or modification of the ordinary duty of reasonable
care.
Id. § 7 cmt. i; see also W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 671, 729 (2008) (explaining that when a judge dismisses a case because the plaintiff
is unable to establish breach as a matter of law, it “requires judges to recognize and
acknowledge that they are deciding a matter ordinarily left to the jury,” which “imposes an
appropriate psychological hurdle for a judge before so ruling”).
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manufacturer owes a duty to warn of foreseeable dangers regardless of the costs of
that warning. For a post-sale warning, however, both the foreseeability of the
danger and the costs of the warning are considered in the fault evaluation. A
reasonable manufacturer would warn only of dangers about which it knows or
should know and only if those dangers were substantial enough to justify the costs.
Unlike a point-of-sale warning, a manufacturer may not owe a post-sale duty to
warn because of the costs of issuing the warning.
III. UNEVENLY BURDENING SMALL MANUFACTURERS WITH THE FACTUALLY
DEPENDENT DUTY
Although a factually dependent duty may be a way to ensure manufacturers
are not overburdened, a factually dependent duty causes another problem. Courts
have relied on particular facts in finding a post-sale duty to warn. The Third
Restatement lists those same facts as factors that courts should consider in
determining whether a post-sale duty to warn should exist. The facts courts have
used and the Third Restatement factors are more likely to be present in cases where
the defendant is a small manufacturer with fewer customers than if the defendant is
a large manufacturer that widely distributes its product. 30
A. Courts Imposing a Duty Based on the Facts
Facts that have motivated courts to impose a post-sale duty to warn include
whether (1) the defendant sold the product to a small or otherwise limited market,
(2) the defendant sold a small amount of products, and (3) the defendant
maintained continuing contact with customers. As illustrated by the cases, these
factors are more likely to be present if the defendant is a small manufacturer.
1. Limited or Specialized Market
Several courts have imposed a post-sale duty to warn on manufacturers that
sold its product to a limited or specialized market. The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
for example, imposed a post-sale duty to warn on a manufacturer of a sausagestuffing machine in Kozlowski v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co. 31 Years after the
defendant first developed the product, an additional safety feature was invented
30

A factually dependent duty does not de jure obligate only small manufacturers. On
its face, a factually dependent duty applies neutrally to all manufacturers regardless of their
size. Despite its neutrality, however, the application of a factually dependent duty will, de
facto, create unequal obligations and liability for small and large manufacturers. Because of
the factors used, a factually dependent duty will most likely obligate more small
manufacturers than large manufacturers to issue a post-sale warning. Similarly, it will more
likely create liability for small manufacturers than large manufacturers. My argument could
be resolved as an empirical matter as more states adopt a post-sale duty and more plaintiffs
pursue that theory of liability. At this point, however, my argument is predictive.
31
275 N.W.2d 915, 918, 923–25 (Wis. 1979).
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that would minimize the possibility of an accident due to excessive pressure while
cleaning the machine. 32 This feature was not on the machines purchased by the
plaintiff’s employer. 33 The court confronted the question of “whether there is a
continuing duty to warn.” 34 The court explained that, in determining whether that
duty exists, the jury “must look to the nature of the industry” along with other
factors. 35
The nature of the industry helped convince the Wisconsin Supreme Court that
the sausage-stuffer manufacturer owed a continuing duty to warn of dangers. “The
sale of a sausage stuffer is to a limited market wherein the manufacturer should
know of all companies that own its product.” 36 Not only should the defendant have
been able to identify all of its customers, it also had the easy ability to notify them
through “trade publications that reached 100% of its customers.” 37 In fact, the
defendant had actually advertised the existence of a safety feature that would have
prevented the plaintiff’s injury in those trade publications,38 and the defendant
listed the safety feature in its repair parts brochure.39 Because of the limited scope
of the industry, the manufacturer owed a “continuing duty to warn of an alleged
defective condition in light of the availability of a . . . safety device.” 40 The jury
would then decide whether the advertisements that the defendant sent out were
adequate post-sale warnings. 41
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania similarly relied on the limited market in
imposing a post-sale duty in Walton v. Avco Corp. 42 Like the sausage-stuffing
machine in Kozlowski, the product in Walton, a helicopter, was sold to a small
market. 43 The helicopter in question seized mid-flight due to a failure of an oil
pump in the engine, killing the passengers in the ensuing crash. 44 The engine
manufacturer had issued a Service Instruction advising of the defect and how to
correct it. 45 The engine manufacturer had sent that Service Instruction to the
helicopter manufacturer, but not to the helicopter’s owners. 46 The court determined

32

Id. at 916–17.
Id. at 917.
34
Id. at 923.
35
Id. at 924. Those other factors included “warnings given, the intended life of the
machine, safety improvements, the number of units sold and reasonable marketing
practices, combined with the consumer expectations inherent therein.” Id.
36
Id. at 923.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 916, 923.
39
Id. at 923.
40
Id.
41
See id.
42
610 A.2d 454, 459–60 (Pa. 1992).
43
Id. at 459.
44
Id. at 456.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 457.
33

2014]

POST-SALE DUTY TO WARN

1025

the helicopter manufacturer was under a duty to warn its service centers and the
purchasers of the affected helicopters. 47
The intermediate court noted the similarities between the case and Kozlowski,
including the limited market for the sale of the products. 48 Specifically, the court
noted its “cognizan[ce] of the nature of the helicopter manufacturing industry. A
helicopter is not a household good, commonly found in almost any home in this
country. It is . . . a unique and costly product which is manufactured, marketed,
and sold to a specialized group of consumers.” 49 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
similarly relied on the market in affirming the post-sale duty: “[T]he peculiarities
of the industry also go far to support this imposition of responsibility.” 50 The court
also explained that helicopters “are sold in a small and distinct market.”51
Although it is possible that any sized manufacturer could sell to a limited
market, it is generally true that a small manufacturer is more likely to sell to a
limited market than a large manufacturer. A smaller manufacturer is more likely to
distribute its products less widely, i.e., less than nationally. Applying this factor of
selling to a limited market, it is more likely that a small manufacturer would owe a
post-sale duty to warn.
Plainly, a court is much less likely to impose a factually dependent post-sale
duty to warn on a larger manufacturer that widely distributes its products. 52 Both
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Kozlowski and the Pennsylvania courts in Walton
make this clear. The Wisconsin Supreme Court specifically explained that it was
not holding
that there is an absolute continuing duty, year after year, for all
manufacturers to warn of a new safety device which eliminates potential
hazards. A sausage stuffer and the nature of that industry bears no
similarity to the realities of manufacturing and marketing household
goods such as fans, snow-blowers [sic] or lawn mowers which have
become increasingly hazard proof with each succeeding model. It is
beyond reason and good judgment to hold a manufacturer responsible for
a duty of annually warning of safety hazards on household items, mass
produced and used in every American home . . . . It would place an
unreasonable duty upon these manufacturers if they were required to
trace the ownership of each unit sold and warn annually of new safety
improvements . . . . 53
47

Id. at 459.
Walton v. Avco Corp., 557 A.2d 372, 378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), aff’d, 610 A.2d
454 (Pa. 1992).
49
Id. at 379.
50
Walton, 610 A.2d at 459.
51
Id.
52
See Richmond, supra note 17, at 43 (explaining that “courts are reluctant to find a
post-sale duty to warn” if a product is “mass-marketed” and “could get swept away in the
currents of commerce” (quoting Walton, 610 A.2d at 459) (internal quotations omitted)).
53
Kozlowski v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 275 N.W.2d 915, 923–24 (Wis. 1979).
48
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By pointing out that “[a] helicopter is not a household good,” the intermediate
Pennsylvania court in Walton similarly implied that it would not find a post-sale
duty to warn if the product at issue was a product found in every household.54 The
affirming Pennsylvania Supreme Court echoed that “[h]elicopters are not ‘ordinary
goods.’ By their nature they are not the types of objects that could get swept away
in the currents of commerce, becoming impossible to track or difficult to locate.
Helicopters are not mass-produced or mass-marketed products . . . .” 55 Again, if
helicopters were ordinary household goods widely distributed, a duty would likely
not exist. 56 Accordingly, application of a factually dependent post-sale duty to
warn is unlikely to result in a duty when the product is distributed widely, as is
likely the case when the defendant is a large manufacturer.
2. Number of Products Sold
Related to the size of the market to which the manufacturer sells is the
number of products the manufacturer sells. If the market is small or specialized, it
is more likely the manufacturer has not mass-produced products and has instead
sold a smaller amount. Not surprisingly, courts have looked to the number of
products sold when determining whether to impose a post-sale duty to warn under
a factually dependent test.
In addition to the limited market factual analysis in Kozlowski and Walton, the
courts relied on the limited number of products sold as a factual basis for imposing
the post-sale duty to warn. In Kozlowski, the Wisconsin Supreme Court mentioned
“the number of units sold” as relevant to the determination of duty. 57 In fact, the
number of units sold was so small the manufacturer should have known all of its
customers because there were not that many of them. 58
In Walton, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted helicopters are a unique
good and are sold only to limited specialized consumers. 59 Again, the manufacturer
should have known all of its customers because there were not that many of them.
Distinguishing Walton, a Pennsylvania federal court later refused to impose a
post-sale duty to warn when the product was a forklift. 60 “[W]hile forklifts are not
common household goods, they are certainly much more prevalent than
helicopters. Nearly any business which has a loading dock or a warehouse has a

54

Walton, 557 A.2d at 379.
Walton, 610 A.2d at 459.
56
See Richmond, supra note 17, at 43 (explaining that courts have not imposed a
post-sale duty to warn in cases involving products that are “ordinary or mass-marketed[,]
includ[ing] heaters, forklifts, and multipiece tire-rim assemblies”).
57
See Kozlowski, 275 N.W.2d at 924.
58
Id. at 923.
59
Walton, 610 A.2d 459.
60
Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 797 F. Supp. 381, 388 (M.D. Pa. 1992), vacated, 36
F.3d 278 (3d Cir. 1994).
55
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forklift . . . .” 61 Because of the commonality and volume of the products sold, no
post-sale duty to warn existed. 62
Other courts have also mentioned the relevance of the number of products
sold to the determination of whether a post-sale duty to warn should exist. In
Cover v. Cohen, 63 New York’s highest court identified “the kind of product
involved and the number manufactured or sold” as relevant. 64 In Crowston v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 65 the North Dakota Supreme Court explained that
the number of products sold is not determinative of whether a duty exists, but it
“militates against individualized notice to the original purchasers.”66 In Patton v.
Hutchinson Wil-Rich Manufacturing Co., 67 the Kansas Supreme Court similarly
identified the “number of units manufactured or sold” as relevant.68 The evaluation
of this fact, among others, “may indicate that notice to all ultimate consumers who
purchased the product prior to the time the manufacturer learned of a potential
danger is unreasonable.” 69
Just as a smaller manufacturer is more likely to distribute its products to a
smaller, more limited market, a smaller manufacturer is also more likely to sell
fewer products, like helicopters or sausage stuffers. This reality means a factually
dependent post-sale duty to warn is more likely to exist when a small manufacturer
is before the court. Similarly, a factually dependent post-sale duty is less likely to
impose a duty on a large manufacturer that distributes its products widely and sells
a greater volume of products. In that case, the manufacturer is less able to identify
the users needing to be warned and provide the actual warning.
3. Continuing Contact with Customers
Courts have been more likely to impose a post-sale duty to warn when the
manufacturer is in contact with the user who needs to be warned. This was true in
Kozlowski, Patton, and Walton. The sausage-stuffing machine manufacturer in
Kozlowski was in an industry in which it should “know of all companies that own
its product.” 70 Plus, the defendant had access to its customers through trade
journals that reached 100% of its customers. 71 The defendant even visited the
61

Id. at 388.
Id.
63
461 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1984).
64
Id. at 872.
65
521 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1994).
66
Id. at 409. The court further stated that a large volume of products sold also
“suggests that manufacturers cannot totally ignore post-sale information which has the
potential to prevent serious injury to so many people.” Id.
67
861 P.2d 1299 (Kan. 1993).
68
Id. at 1315.
69
Id.
70
Kozlowski v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 275 N.W.2d 915, 923 (Wis. 1979); see
also id. at 924 (describing the sausage-stuffer machine market as “limited in scope”).
71
Id. at 923.
62

1028

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

plaintiff’s employer’s plant twice, but for an unknown reason, the defendant never
disclosed the danger resulting from excessive pressure or the new safety feature
that would have eliminated the danger. 72 This continuing contact helped convince
the court a duty existed.
In Patton, the Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged that “[n]otification by a
manufacturer to all prior purchasers of a product may be extremely burdensome, if
not impossible,” weighing against the imposition of a post-sale duty to warn. 73 But
in that particular case, the manufacturer had a way to reach consumers—its retailer
had “continuing contact with the consumers.” 74 In Walton, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court described the fact the manufacturer had remained in contact with
the plaintiff “for the very purpose of keeping [him] current on all pertinent
information” as “[e]ven more important” than the limited market in determining
that a post-sale duty to warn existed. 75
Maine courts have also recognized the importance of this continuing contact.
In Brown v. Crown Equipment Corp., 76 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine found
liability for a failure to warn when the manufacturer knew of the risk, had created a
kit to help reduce that risk, was in personal contact with the purchaser who was
injured, and had even evaluated the specific forklift that injured the purchaser. 77
The court had “no difficulty concluding” the manufacturer owed a duty to the
plaintiff “as a known user of that forklift.” 78 The court also characterized the claim
as a “straightforward negligence claim,” meaning the duty existed because a
reasonable manufacturer would have issued the post-sale warning under those
circumstances. 79
A New Jersey court held similarly in Dixon v. Jacobsen Manufacturing Co. 80
In Dixon, the court focused on the fact that the “manufacturer was aware of the
identity of the current owner of the product.” 81 The manufacturer was aware
because the owner had contacted the manufacturer to request “any information”
about the machine, covering the fact that an additional safeguard had been added to
the machinery since the original manufacture. 82 The court acknowledged that
numerous courts had been reluctant to impose a post-sale duty to warn because of
72

See id.
Patton, 861 P.2d at 1314.
74
Id.; see also Reiss v. Komatsu Am. Corp., 735 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1150 (D.N.D.
2010) (refusing to grant summary judgment on the basis of a lack of a post-sale duty to
warn partly because the defendant kept records of products sold).
75
Walton v. Avco Corp., 610 A.2d 454, 459 (Pa. 1992).
76
960 A.2d 1188 (Me. 2008).
77
Id. at 1193.
78
Id.
79
Id. The Maine court further declined to adopt section 10 of the Third Restatement,
instead “recogniz[ing] a post-sale duty to warn indirect, known purchasers as it applies to
the facts of this case.” Id. at 1193–94.
80
637 A.2d 915 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
81
Id. at 922.
82
Id. at 923.
73
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“the burden that such a duty places on manufacturers to ascertain the identity of
current owners of the product, especially consumer products.” 83 But “[n]o such
policy consideration exists where the owner is known,” as in this case. 84 The court
thus had “no hesitation in holding that such a duty existed.” 85
It is possible for a manufacturer of any size to maintain some type of
continuing contact with customers. This continuing contact is more likely to occur,
however, if the manufacturer has a small number of customers, which a small
manufacturer is likely to have. A small manufacturer may keep in contact with the
customer for purposes of maintaining the machine, like in Kozlowski, or to ensure
the customer is kept up to date. This type of continuing contact is more likely to
occur if it is easy for the manufacturer, such as when there are a limited amount of
customers. The reality that small manufacturers have a limited number of
customers means a court will be more likely to impose a post-sale duty to warn on
a small manufacturer.
A large manufacturer, on the other hand, is unlikely to have systematic
continuing contact with its customers. When the number of customers is large,
systematic continuing contact is more difficult. The lack of continuing contact with
customers makes it less likely that a large manufacturer would owe a factually
dependent post-sale duty to warn. It is possible that a large manufacturer may have
some continuing contact; for example, a customer may contact the manufacturer,
as was the case in Dixon. But that is likely the exception.
B. Third Restatement Factors
The Third Restatement states that the duty should exist only “if a reasonable
person in the seller’s position would provide such a warning.” 86 The Third
Restatement also dictates four factors to determine whether a reasonable person
would have provided such a warning:
1. the seller knows or reasonably should know that the product poses a
substantial risk of harm to persons or property; and
2. those to whom a warning might be provided can be identified and can
reasonably be assumed to be unaware of the risk of harm; and
3. a warning can be effectively communicated to and acted on by those to
whom a warning might be provided; and
4. the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the burden of providing
a warning. 87

83

Id.
Id.
85
Id. at 924.
86
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10(a).
87
Id. § 10(b). For a duty to exist, the plaintiff must establish each of these elements.
See id. § 10 reporters’ note cmt. a; see also Twerski, supra note 29, at 20.
84
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As was also true of the facts that courts evaluated to determine if a post-sale
duty to warn should exist, application of the Third Restatement’s factors will often
lead to a small manufacturer owing a post-sale duty to warn, but not a large
manufacturer.
1. Knowledge of the Substantial Risk
The first Third Restatement factor clarifies that a warning will only potentially
be legally required if “the seller knows or reasonably should know that the product
poses a substantial risk of harm to persons or property.” 88 This requirement ensures
that a manufacturer can be liable only if it is at fault—if it knew or should have
known about the danger.
This factor likely applies neutrally to manufacturers regardless of their size.
Whether large or small, a manufacturer may become aware, or should have
become aware, of a danger presented by its product. If anything, this factor may be
present more often for large manufacturers than for small ones. Generally
speaking, large manufacturers may have more resources for research and
development, meaning they may be more likely to discover dangers. Large
manufacturers are also likely to have more customers, increasing the chances that
someone might be injured and complain to the manufacturer. At the same time, a
customer may be more likely to complain of injury to a small manufacturer than to
a large manufacturer because the small manufacturer may be more likely to
respond.
Regardless, this factor, imposing a duty only if a manufacturer is aware or
should be aware of a danger, likely applies neutrally to all manufacturers
regardless of their size. It is, however, only one of four factors.
2. Ability to Identify Those Needing a Warning
The second factor requires a warning only if those needing a warning “can be
identified.” 89 Identifying those users can be difficult. As an example, if a vacuum
manufacturer “manufactured and distributed vacuum cleaners commercially to
millions of consumers over the course of many years” 90 and if the retailers that
88

THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10(b)(1).
Id. § 10(b)(2). Federal agencies require some industries to track purchases to
facilitate government-ordered recalls. The Consumer Protection Safety Commission
requires manufacturers of “durable infant or toddler product[s]” to include a registration
card with the product and then maintain a record of any returned cards. 16 C.F.R.
§§ 1130.3, 1130.8(a) (2014). This enables communication with users to “improve the
effectiveness of recalls of, and safety alerts regarding, such products.” § 1130.1(a). The
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration also requires that manufacturers of child
car seats include a registration card. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 588.4–.5 (2013). Again, the express
purpose of this requirement is “to aid manufacturers in contacting the owners of child
restraints.” § 588.2.
90
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. e, illus. 2.
89
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sold the vacuum cleaners have “[o]nly scanty and incomplete sales records,” 91 the
lack of records would weigh against imposing a post-sale duty to warn on the
vacuum manufacturer. In fact, “when no such records are available, the seller’s
inability to identify those for whom warnings would be useful may properly
prevent a post-sale duty to warn from arising.” 92
The inability to identify the user precluded the existence of a duty in Lewis v.
Ariens Co. 93 There, the plaintiff had purchased a snow blower from a friend’s
sister about sixteen years after it was originally sold, 94 making the plaintiff difficult
to identify. The court described the plaintiff as a “member of a universe too diffuse
and too large for manufacturers or sellers of original equipment to identify,”
thereby negating a post-sale duty to warn. 95
Russell v. Wright 96 illustrates the opposite situation. There, the manufacturer
of a taser gun operated a certification program to be used in training police officers
and regularly updated those training materials. 97 The manufacturer’s relationship
with the police department enabled it to inform purchasers of any new warnings or
information. 98 The court explained that this manufacturer was “in a much better
position than most manufacturers to ensure that users of its product are kept up to
date on new warnings and instructions,” weighing in favor of imposing a post-sale
duty to warn. 99
Small manufacturers can likely identify those needing a warning more easily
than large manufacturers. Naturally, a small manufacturer is likely to sell fewer
products and have fewer customers than a larger business. 100 The fewer the
customers, the more likely it is the manufacturer will have some continuing contact
with its customers, perhaps through continuing maintenance and support services
like in Russell. Even if contact does not continue, the fewer the customers, the
more likely it is the manufacturer might have maintained some purchasing records.
But even without records, the fewer the customers, the easier it will be for the
manufacturer to identify the customers. In Jones v. Bowie Industries, Inc., 101 the
Supreme Court of Alaska found that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s
finding of liability for failing to warn after the sale partly because of the relative

91

Id.
Id. § 10 cmt. e.
93
751 N.E.2d 862 (Mass. 2001).
94
Id. at 863.
95
Id. at 867 (quoting Lewis v. Ariens Co., 729 N.E.2d 323, 327 (Mass. App. Ct.
2000)).
96
916 F. Supp. 2d 629 (W.D. Va. 2013).
97
Id. at 651.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
See Ross, supra note 15, at 348 (explaining that the ability to identify those
needing to be warned will depend on numerous factors, including “the number of units
sold”).
101
282 P.3d 316 (Alaska 2012).
92

1032

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

ease of identifying customers. 102 The defendant had “produced relatively few
hydromulchers like the one that injured [the plaintiff], making identification of the
class of ultimate users less burdensome.” 103
Even if a small manufacturer does not have continuing contact, records, or
other means of identifying customers, a small manufacturer is likely to have a
more “geographically limited market.” 104 The Third Restatement explains that
“[i]ndividual names and addresses are not necessarily required,” but identification
of a class of product users or “geographically limited markets” may satisfy this
factor. 105 This identification would enable some sort of public notice. 106 Thus, even
when a small manufacturer cannot identify individual customers despite the limited
amount of products sold, it will likely be able to identify a specific geographical
area, which weighs in favor of imposing a post-sale duty to warn.
None of this is true for large manufacturers. Larger manufacturers are less
likely to have any continuing contact with customers. A larger manufacturer is also
unlikely to maintain customer records simply because of the cost. 107 Why incur
what could be a very expensive cost when not legally obligated to do so? The
larger the amount of customers, the more expensive the costs may be because of
the greater volume of purchases to be tracked. A large manufacturer is also likely
to sell to a non-limited market, meaning it would be unable to identify a
102

Id. at 335–36.
Id. at 336; see also Jarrett v. Duro-Med Indus., No. 05-102-JBC, 2007 WL
628146, at *5 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (finding that the customer needing a warning was easily
identifiable because the defendant was aware that the plaintiff’s specific wheelchair lacked
a working right wheel brake, but it did not warn the plaintiff of the resulting danger).
Additionally, in Lovick v. Wil-Rich, the defendant had manufactured approximately
35,000 cultivators since it first introduced the cultivator into the market in 1971. 588
N.W.2d 688, 692 (Iowa 1999). Beginning in 1988, the defendant began including a more
specific warning label of the dangers of operating the cultivator. Id. The Iowa Supreme
Court adopted the factors enumerated in the Third Restatement to determine if a post-sale
duty to warn existed for individuals who purchased the cultivator before 1988 and
remanded the case, so the trial court could instruct the jury regarding those four factors. Id.
at 695–96.
104
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. e.
105
Id.
106
Madden, supra note 24, at 47.
107
Regardless of the size of the manufacturer, “in the case of consumer goods, it is
unlikely that retailers will maintain detailed sales records allowing the identification of
purchasers or users.” Tom Stilwell, Warning: You May Possess Continuing Duties After the
Sale of Your Product!, 26 REV. LITIG. 1035, 1055 (2007); see also Ross, supra note 15, at
348–49 (“Establishing a ‘traceability’ system before the product is sold is the most
effective way to find customers. However, such systems take planning, considerable effort,
and substantial cost.”). Presumably, this is even truer when those detailed sales records
would need to be extensive (and thus expensive) because of the volume of customers. Of
course, more and more purchases of goods are made online. Because these purchases
necessarily do not involve cash, some record of the purchase will exist. These records may
make personal communication more feasible, even with a high volume of customers.
103

2014]

POST-SALE DUTY TO WARN

1033

geographically limited market in which it sells. This inability to identify customers
“may properly prevent a post-sale duty to warn from arising.” 108
3. The Ability to Effectively Communicate a Warning
The Third Restatement’s third factor asks whether “a warning can be
effectively communicated to and acted on by those to whom a warning might be
provided.” 109 Comment g explains that if records exist identifying the consumers,
“direct communication of a warning may be feasible.” 110
In Jones, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, allowing the jury to decide
liability for a post-sale failure to warn partially because the manufacturer could
have effectively communicated the warning. 111 Not only was identification of users
not particularly burdensome because of the relatively few hydromulchers sold, but
the hydromulcher was also a “specialized machine[] with a limited population of
users, so that advertisements in trade publications were another viable method
of . . . warning.” 112 Similarly, in Jarrett v. Duro-Med Industries, 113 the defendant
had direct contact with the plaintiff because the plaintiff brought her wheelchair to
the defendant “to request a replacement right wheel brake.”114 This face-to-face
contact provided an opportunity for an effectively communicated warning. 115
Direct communication is only feasible if the users or consumers are
identifiable, 116 which is more likely to be true for small manufacturers. This also
means that small manufacturers will likely be able to warn in the most effective
way—direct communication—meaning this factor will likely always weigh in
favor of liability for a small manufacturer that failed to warn.
Large manufacturers are less likely to be able to warn directly because of the
inability to identify their customers. They may have some records based on
customer loyalty programs, but records of only customers’ email addresses allows
for communication only via email. Even though this is a form of direct
communication, it is arguably ineffective given users likely ignore spam-like
emails. It is more likely that large manufacturers will not have any ability to
identify their many customers, precluding direct communication. In this case, the
Third Restatement explains that “it may be necessary to utilize the public media to
108

THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. e; see also Madden, supra note 24,
at 47 (explaining that for some products, “price, perishability, limited useful life, or the
availability of such products through typical over-the-counter markets which
characteristically do not involve recording the purchasers’ name, will militate against
finding a post-sale duty to warn individual product users or consumers”).
109
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10(b)(3).
110
Id. § 10 cmt. g.
111
See Jones v. Bowie Indus., Inc., 282 P.3d 316, 336 (Alaska 2012).
112
Id.
113
No. 05-102-JBC, 2007 WL 628146 (E.D. Ky. 2007).
114
Id. at *1.
115
Id. at *5.
116
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. g.
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disseminate information regarding risks of substantial harm.” 117 Thus, a large
manufacturer may have to issue some sort of broad public notice through the
public media.
The Third Restatement cautions, however, that it may not require this type of
broad mass warning. Specifically, it notes that as the amount of those needing to be
warned increases, the “costs of communicating warnings may increase and their
effectiveness may decrease.” 118 This language suggests a large manufacturer may
not be required to issue a mass warning. Indeed, why should the law require a large
manufacturer to incur the great expense of a mass warning when the warning is
unlikely to be effective anyway? The Third Restatement’s highlighting of the cost
and ineffectiveness of a mass notice—the only type of notice a large manufacturer
could even do—indicates the large manufacturer would not be obligated to issue
such a notice.
4. The Scale of the Harm and the Cost of the Warning
The last Third Restatement factor is whether the “risk of harm is sufficiently
great to justify the burden of providing a warning.” 119 This factor instructs courts
to look to the burden of providing a warning, i.e., the costs of the warning. “In the
post-sale context, identifying those who should receive a warning and
communicating the warning to them can require large expenditures.” 120 Because of
the cost, even if a substantial risk exists, there may be no duty to warn. 121
This factor seems neutral in application to small and large manufacturers.
Regardless of the size of the business, a warning is legally required only if the risk
of harm justifies the costs of that warning. But this factor does not apply neutrally
because of the relevance of costs. The costs for small and large manufacturers will
not be the same. The cost of a warning would be less expensive for the small
manufacturer because of the amount and the geographical limitations of the small
manufacturer’s customers. The smaller expense to warn customers will always
weigh in favor of a post-sale duty to warn existing for a small manufacturer.
The Third Restatement’s post-sale duty to warn is based in negligence, and
“[w]hat is reasonably prudent post-sale conduct for one manufacturer and one type
of product may not be reasonable for another manufacturer of an entirely different
type of product.” 122 Suppose the product danger is the same for two manufacturers.
The first manufacturer’s costs, however, may be so large (because of the number
of customers to contact) that issuing a post-sale warning is unreasonable and thus
not required. The second manufacturer’s costs to warn may be reasonable simply
because there are fewer customers to warn. If the costs are reasonable, then a
warning is required. The hypothetical holds true even if the product and the
117

Id.
Id.
119
Id. § 10(b)(4).
120
Id. § 10 cmt. i.
121
Id.
122
Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1314 (Kan. 1993).
118
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materialized danger are exactly the same. But because of the different costs of a
post-sale warning, the small manufacturer with fewer customers would owe a duty
and the large manufacturer would not.
There is some possibility that a large manufacturer may still owe a duty even
when its costs of warning are high. That is because the size of the harm depends on
both the frequency of the harm and its expected severity. 123 Because of the amount
of customers, harm to the customers of a large manufacturer will occur more
frequently. Three out of six customers of a small manufacturer may be hurt,
whereas three million out of six million customers of a large manufacturer may be
hurt. The level of harm for three million customers will likely be substantial. If the
analysis were a simple benefits of warning (protecting three million consumers)
versus costs of warning (again all six million consumers), the large manufacturer
would likely owe a duty to warn despite the costs.
However, the Third Restatement does not create this simple weighing of the
benefits versus costs analysis. Instead, it also mandates consideration of the
effectiveness of the warning. 124 Practically, identifying all six million customers is
likely impossible. The only way to warn those six million customers would be
through some sort of mass warning. But a mass warning is unlikely to be
effective. 125 Even if the harm is substantial because of its frequency, due to the
volume of customers, both the costs and the likely ineffectiveness still weigh
against the post-sale warning obligation. Thus, even though the frequency of injury
is likely to be high for a large manufacturer because of the volume of its
customers, this does not mean the large manufacturer will owe a duty to warn. To
the contrary, the harm is only one factor that courts weigh against both the
extensive costs and the likely ineffectiveness of communication, both of which will
weigh against imposing a post-sale warning obligation on larger manufacturers.
For the small manufacturer, though, the harm is a factor weighed against less
extensive costs and the likely effectiveness of direct communication, all of which
will weigh in favor of imposing a post-sale warning obligation.
Returning to the relevance of costs, the Third Restatement does not instruct
courts to look at the costs of warning relative to the specific defendant’s finances.
If this were true, then even though a large manufacturer’s costs to warn were large,
they may not look so large in relation to the large manufacturer’s overall financial
situation. Similarly, a small manufacturer’s costs to warn may be less expensive,
but they still may be excessive when compared to the small manufacturer’s overall
123

THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. d (explaining that there would be no
duty to warn of dangers that “occur infrequently and are not likely to cause substantial
harm”); see also Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401, 409 (N.D.
1994) (describing that a large volume of products sold also “suggests that manufacturers
cannot totally ignore post-sale information which has the potential to prevent serious injury
to so many people”).
124
See supra Part III.B.2.
125
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. g (“As the group to whom warnings
might be provided increases in size, costs of communicating warnings may increase and
their effectiveness may decrease.”).
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financial situation and capability. Despite this disparity, nothing in the Third
Restatement suggests this type of particularized evaluation of the costs. 126
In any case, such an evaluation of the specific defendant’s finances would not
be consistent with negligence law generally. 127 “Unreasonable conduct is merely
the failure to take precautions that would generate greater benefits in avoiding
accidents than the precautions would cost.” 128 Accordingly, if the costs of injury
outweigh the costs of the precaution, 129 then the reasonable actor would have
undertaken that necessary precaution. But if the costs of the precaution outweigh
the costs of injury, then the precaution is unnecessary and a reasonable actor would
not take it, 130 even if he could personally afford it. Moreover, the law should not be
that a manufacturer is obligated to undertake unnecessary precautions simply
because it could afford it. 131 This would hurt society as it could cause
manufacturers to “undesirably curtail their activities . . . [and] set prices above the
proper level, chilling consumption of their products.” 132 Such a law could also be
potentially unfair as it would “effectively impose[] a tax on corporate size and
success, thereby discouraging growth and development.” 133 Lastly, if abundant
financial resources were a reason to impose liability, would insufficient financial
resources be a reason to negate liability? Surely, this is not a desirable result.
Thus, for valid reasons, the Third Restatement does not contemplate
evaluation of the specific defendant’s financial resources. Instead, the costs are
evaluated without any context—meaning a large manufacturer’s costs likely will
be high, negating the likelihood of post-sale warning liability, and a small
manufacturer’s costs likely will be low, increasing the likelihood of post-sale
warning liability.

126

The Third Restatement instead explains that identifying users and communicating
the warning “can require large expenditures,” and thus the obligation to warn after sale
should exist “only if the risk of harm is sufficiently great.” Id. § 10 cmt. i.
127
Id. (explaining that the “test defining unreasonable conduct is that which governs
negligence generally”).
128
McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1987).
129
See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(introducing an analytical formula for determining reasonable conduct: weighing the
probability and severity of injury versus the burden of adequate precaution).
130
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 879 (1998) (defining a “socially excessive precaution” as a
precaution “that costs more than the reduction of harm produced by it”).
131
Id. at 911. This also raises questions of how the jury would determine whether a
defendant could “afford” a post-sale warning. Is it that the defendant’s business was
profitable overall that year? Or is it that the defendant has excess cash at the time it should
have warned?
132
Id.
133
Id.; see also id. at 912 (explaining that “retarding the natural growth of
corporations can have adverse consequences, notably, that society forgoes economies of
scale in production and in research and development”).
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IV. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH A RULE THAT
(UNINTENTIONALLY) TARGETS SMALL MANUFACTURERS
A law that is more likely to create liability for small manufacturers than for
large manufacturers is problematic. It is inconsistent with the theories underlying
products liability law. 134 The factually dependent duty is also inconsistent with
general public policy because of its potentially devastating consequences for small
manufacturers, the same manufacturers already most vulnerable to the effects of
products liability. Ironically, a factually dependent duty is also most likely to apply
to this most vulnerable manufacturer.
A. Inconsistent with the Underlying Theories of Products Liability
Various theories underlie the imposition of liability on manufacturers when
their products injure people. The theories include (1) fairness, (2) the
manufacturer’s superior position, (3) self-determination, (4) deterrence, and (5)
risk spreading. None of these theories support a factually dependent post-sale duty
because of its delineation between manufacturers that have to warn and those that
do not. All of these theories, however, likely support the imposition of a broad
post-sale duty to warn owed by all manufacturers regardless of the costs of the
warning.
1. Fairness
“This idea of fairness embodies the maxim that those who design, market, and
profit from a product should also pay for the injuries it causes.” 135 The idea of
134

Technically, the theories of products liability explored in this section are the
theories behind imposing strict liability for defective products that injure plaintiffs. There
has been gradual movement away from strict liability for defective products. See e.g.,
David A. Logan, When the Restatement Is Not a Restatement: The Curious Case of the
“Flagrant Trespasser,” 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1448, 1459–60 (2011). If the product is
defective because of a manufacturing defect, liability is still strict. If the product is
defective because of its design and the jurisdiction uses the consumer expectations test,
liability is also strict. But if the product is defective because of an inadequate warning,
liability is based in negligence in all jurisdictions. See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying
text. Similarly, if the product is defective in its design, liability is essentially based in
negligence if the court follows the risk-utility test. See supra note 15. Any liability for a
post-sale failure to warn is similarly based in negligence—a manufacturer failing to warn
about a later-materialized danger about which it knew or should have known. These
theories, although originally invoked to adopt strict liability, can still support negligencebased liability for injuries caused by defective products.
135
Ellen Wertheimer, The Third Restatement of Torts: An Unreasonably Dangerous
Doctrine, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1235, 1235 (1994); see also Brooks v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 58 (N.M. 1995) (“The burden of illness from dangerous products . . .
should be placed upon those who profit from its production . . . .” (quoting Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 1982)).
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fairness also includes the evaluation of who should bear the costs of the injury,
whether it is the manufacturer or the injured consumer. The manufacturer is
responsible for the injury and should pay the resultant damages. 136 California
Supreme Court Justice Traynor long ago pointed to fairness as a reason for making
manufacturers liable: “The purpose of . . . liability is to insure that the costs of
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless
to protect themselves.” 137
The fairness theory supports the imposition of a broad post-sale duty to warn
on all manufacturers. The manufacturer puts the product on the market and profits
from doing so. So, the costs of injuries caused by later-materialized dangers of the
product should be borne by the manufacturer who placed the dangerous product on
the market. A New Jersey court recognized this fairness rationale when adopting a
post-sale duty to warn in Dixon v. Jacobsen Manufacturing Co., explaining that the
“imposition of a duty on the manufacturer to warn of dangers after a product is
manufactured, and the extent of that duty, is essentially rooted in concepts of
fairness.” 138
Between the manufacturer and the injured user, courts should force the
manufacturer to cover the costs of the injury resulting from the manufacturer’s
failure to issue a post-sale warning. True, the risk was possibly unknowable at the
time of manufacture. But by the time a manufacturer may need to issue a post-sale
warning, the danger is known (or should have been known). If a manufacturer fails
to warn of such a danger, the manufacturer is liable. This is liability based on fault;
a reasonable manufacturer would have warned and this defendant is liable for a
failure to act like that reasonable manufacturer. Fairness dictates that between a
manufacturer who is at fault and an injured user, the manufacturer should be forced
to cover the costs of the user’s injury.
Even though fairness supports the imposition of a broad post-sale duty to
warn, it does not support the factually dependent version developed in early case
law and the Third Restatement because of its consideration of costs. At first glance,
it would seem fair to consider the defendant’s costs in determining liability for
failing to issue a post-sale warning. But the fairness theory dictates “that the
burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be
placed upon those who market” the product. 139 Thus, those who placed the product
on the market should be liable regardless of the costs of warning.
136

Wertheimer, supra note 135, at 1238–39 (“[I]f neither the manufacturer nor the
consumer is an appropriate cost-avoider, then the entity who placed the product on the
market and profited from its sales should pay.”); see also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (“If such products nevertheless
find their way into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for
whatever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in
the manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market.”).
137
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
138
637 A.2d 915, 923 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
139
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965).
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Similarly, the factually dependent post-sale duty is also inconsistent with the
fairness theory because of how it distinguishes between manufacturers. If the costs
of issuing a post-sale warning are too great, which will often be true for large
manufacturers, that manufacturer will not be liable because a reasonable
manufacturer would not have issued a warning. But if the costs are reasonable,
which will often be true for small manufacturers, the manufacturer will be liable.
The fairness theory, however, would not recognize distinctions based on what
types of manufacturers should be liable and which should not, especially any
distinction based on costs. Costly warnings or not, the manufacturer put the
dangerous product on the market and should have to pay for the injuries the
product caused.
Lastly, the factually dependent post-sale duty is inconsistent with the fairness
theory because of how it distinguishes between consumers. The factually
dependent duty distinguishes between consumers who are limited to a small
geographic market (who would be entitled to a warning under a factually
dependent post-sale duty to warn) and consumers who are dispersed nationwide
(who would not be entitled to such a warning). The fairness theory, however,
dictates that “the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of
protection” from “those who market the products.” 140 All consumers deserve this
maximum protection, not just some. Thus, fairness supports the imposition of a
broad post-sale duty to warn where all consumers would be warned regardless of
the costs.
2. Manufacturer Is in a Superior Position to Discover Dangers
Another principle underlying products liability that is somewhat similar to
fairness is the manufacturer’s superior ability to discover dangers. Just as the
manufacturer put the dangerous product on the market, the manufacturer is in the
best position to eliminate those dangers. As Justice Traynor explained in Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 141 “[i]t is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate
some hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot.
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its
consequences.” 142 The manufacturer has this superior position because of “the
processes of design, testing, inspection and collection of data on product safety

140

Id.
150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
142
Id. at 440–41 (Traynor, J., concurring); see also id. at 443 (“The consumer no
longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product,
even when it is not contained in a sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance has been
lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and
marketing such devices as trade-marks.”). Justice Traynor used this language to advocate
for strict liability. However, it also supports negligence-based liability.
141
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performance in the field.” 143 Imposing liability should motivate manufacturers “to
use this information to help combat the massive problem of product accidents.” 144
This principle supports the imposition of a post-sale duty to warn for all
manufacturers regardless of costs. In the post-sale scenario, the manufacturer is in
a superior position to discover dangers from its product. People hurt by products
will often complain to the manufacturer 145 and may even sue the manufacturer.
Through either form of notification, the manufacturer could discover dangers in its
product, including dangers about which it did not know pre-sale. Related to these
complaints or not, the manufacturer may also continue to research and develop its
products even after sale. Again, through this research, the manufacturer could
discover dangers in its product.
An individual user does not have access to this type of information. He has no
idea whether others have been harmed by the manufacturer’s product. He also has
no idea what additional research has shown regarding the dangers of the product.
The discrepancy between the manufacturer’s knowledge and the consumer’s
knowledge may even be greater post-sale than it is pre-sale.
Some courts have relied on the manufacturer’s superior position in adopting a
post-sale duty to warn. Specifically, the New York Court of Appeals stated:
The justification for the post-sale duty to warn arises from a
manufacturer’s unique (and superior) position to follow the use and
adaptation of its product by consumers. Compared to purchasers and
users of a product, a manufacturer is best placed to learn about post-sale
defects or dangers discovered in use. 146
Alaska courts have cited this language, 147 and Iowa courts have also pointed to this
justification as the reason for a post-sale duty. 148 These courts are correct. The
manufacturer has superior knowledge of dangers accompanying its products that
emerge only after sale. Imposing a post-sale duty to warn would force
manufacturers to share this information and help combat product accidents.

143

David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L.
REV. 1258, 1258 (1976).
144
Id.; see also Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 207–08 (N.Y.
1983) (“A manufacturer is held liable regardless of his lack of actual knowledge of the
condition of the product because he is in the superior position to discover any design
defects and alter the design before making the product available to the public.”).
145
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 10 cmt. c (“As a practical matter, most postsale duties to warn arise when new information is brought to the attention of the seller,
after the time of sale, concerning risks accompanying the product’s use or consumption.”).
146
Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 700 N.E.2d 303, 307 (N.Y. 1998) (citation omitted).
147
Jones v. Bowie Indus., Inc., 282 P.3d 316, 334–35 & n.65 (Alaska 2012).
148
Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Iowa 1999) (explaining that warning
obligations “reduce the chance of injury by equalizing the asymmetry of information
between the parties”).
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Even though a manufacturer’s superior position supports a post-sale duty to
warn, it does not support the factually dependent version that courts have adopted
and that is included in the Third Restatement. This is because the factually
dependent version of the post-sale duty to warn will obligate some, but not others,
to warn based on the costs of the warning. Regardless of those costs, the
manufacturer is in a superior position, relative to the consumer, to discover dangers
post sale. Also, the manufacturers most likely to have an obligation to warn will be
small manufacturers, even though large manufacturers may be in an even more
superior position to discover dangers. 149 Regardless of its size, the manufacturer is
in a superior position, relative to the consumer, to discover dangers post sale. All
manufacturers should thus be obligated to warn of dangers materializing after sale.
Plus, a distinction between manufacturers based on the costs of
communicating the warning to consumers makes little sense in light of this
purpose. Those that can communicate easily, most likely smaller manufacturers,
are obligated; those who cannot communicate easily, most likely larger
manufacturers, are not obligated despite their superior knowledge. Regardless of
the ease of communicating, all manufacturers are in a superior position to discover
dangers relative to consumers.
3. Individual Autonomy/Self-Determination
Liability for a point-of-sale failure to warn is also supported by another
theoretical justification that is specific only to warning defects—educating users
about the risks of the product enables the user to determine whether to purchase the
product. This theory supports a broad post-sale duty to warn, but not a factually
dependent one that would obligate some manufacturers but not others.
(a) Self-Determination Versus Minimizing Injury
Warnings can serve two purposes. “First, warnings may reduce the risk of
product-related injury by allowing consumers to behave more carefully than if they
remained ignorant of risks associated with product use.” 150 The second purpose is
different; it does not simply allow consumers to act more carefully. Instead,
warnings provide consumers “the information necessary to choose whether or not
they wish to encounter certain kinds of risks on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.” 151
149

See infra Part IV.B.
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 13, at 285.
151
Id. The Third Restatement also recognizes these two purposes: “Warnings alert
users and consumers to the existence and nature of product risks so that they can prevent
harm either by appropriate conduct during use or consumption or by choosing not to use or
consume.” THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 2 cmt. i. Professors James A. Henderson,
Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski label this purpose of warnings as the “social utility” purpose. See
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability
Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1318 (1991).
This purpose requires warnings that will “reduce the risk of product-related injury by
150
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This second purpose promotes individual autonomy. 152 By fully informing a
user of the dangers of a product, the user is able to make a cost-benefit decision on
whether to purchase the product. “[T]his kind of informed consent value focuses
on protecting a user’s individual rights—specifically, the user’s right of selfdetermination, the right to ‘determine his own fate.’” 153 An adequate warning is
required because “the user or consumer is entitled to make his own choice as to
whether the product’s utility or benefits justify exposing himself to the risk of
harm.” 154
This self-determination basis for imposing a duty to warn mirrors an informed
consent medical malpractice case. This type of medical malpractice case does not
question whether the doctor did the proper surgery or adequately performed that
surgery. Instead, the focus is on whether the doctor properly disclosed the risks of
that surgery to the patient. Proper disclosure is necessary to provide the patient
with “adequate information” to enable him to decide “whether he wishes to
encounter the risk[s]” associated with treatment. 155 Many states use a standard to
determine the required contents of the disclosure based on what a reasonable
patient would want to know. 156
allowing consumers to behave more carefully.” Henderson & Twerski, supra note 13, at
285. The self-determination purpose, on the other hand, enables users to determine whether
the utility of the product justifies encountering the risks. This purpose “reflects fairness
concerns more clearly than the risk-reduction efforts.” Id.
152
OWEN, supra note 5, § 9.1, at 585; see also OWEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 9.1, at
513–14 (“The latter rationale—informed consent—reflects the societal judgment that a
product user or consumer is entitled to make his own choice as to whether the product’s
utility or benefits justify exposing himself or others to the risk of harm.”); Henderson &
Twerski, supra note 13, at 285 (explaining that the self-determination purpose obligates
warnings that “provide consumers with the information necessary to choose whether or not
they wish to encounter certain kinds of risks on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis”); THIRD
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 2 cmt. i (“[W]arnings allow the user or consumer to avoid
the risk warned against by making an informed decision not to purchase or use the product
at all and hence not encounter the risk.”).
153
OWEN, supra note 5, § 9.1, at 585 (citing Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc.,
727 F.2d 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1984)). The Fifth Circuit describes self-determination as one of
the principles underlying strict liability for failure to warn. Pavlides, 727 F.2d at 338. The
other principle underlying strict liability for failure to warn is “social utility” in that “a
warning that costs the manufacturer little can prevent severe losses by enabling users to
avert harm.” Id.
154
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973); see
also Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A] warning can do more
than exhort its audience to be careful. It can also affect what activities the people warned
choose to engage in.”).
155
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 13, at 286.
156
See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786–87 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (requiring
disclosure of “all risks potentially affecting the [patient’s] decision”); Largey v. Rothman,
540 A.2d 504, 508 (N.J. 1988) (requiring a physician to disclose risks that “a reasonable
patient . . . would be likely to attach significance to” (quoting Cantebury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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(b) Supporting a Post-Sale Duty to Warn Owed by All Manufacturers
The self-determination purpose of warnings supports the imposition of a postsale duty to warn, enabling the user to continue to make informed decisions
regarding product use. When the user first uses a sausage-stuffing machine, a
warning enables him to make the informed decision whether to use it. Every time
the user uses the machine, he continually needs to make an informed decision. If a
danger is discovered six months after he first uses it without being informed of that
danger, the user is prevented from making an informed decision whether to
continue to use the machine.
Granted, this possible later decision to cease use differs from the initial
decision to use. At the initial decision, the user may decide not to purchase the
product at all because of the foreseeable dangers. At the later decision, the user has
already invested in the product, creating the natural tendency to want to continue
use; a decision to cease use would create an additional loss based on the value of
the machine at that point. The user needs to be able to balance the foreseeable
dangers of continued use against this natural tendency to avoid the loss.157
Whether at the initial or later decision, however, the self-determination
purpose aims to ensure the decision belongs to the user—the user can decide if the
product’s benefits outweigh its costs (the foreseeable dangers and out-of-pocket
losses based on the then-existing value of the product). Without full disclosure of
the substantial dangers, including the dangers that arise only years after purchase,
this cost-benefit decision is transferred back from the user to the manufacturer.
The Eleventh Circuit alluded to the self-determination purpose in the context
of post-sale warnings in Watkins v. Ford Motor Co. 158 There, the defendant’s
expert testified that once the consumer decided to drive the car at issue, “no
warning could guard against the dangers of rollover.” 159 The court explained,
however, that the purpose of a warning, a point-of-sale or a post-sale warning, is
not necessarily to prevent an accident. 160 Instead, warnings are required to allow
the user “to make an informed decision whether to take on the risks warned of.” 161
Once the defendant discovers the risk of a rollover, it must warn the user of that

157

Even if some users choose to continue using the product to avoid the loss, it does
not negate the need to warn under the self-determination purpose. See THIRD
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 2, cmt. i (“Whether or not many persons would, when
warned, nonetheless decide to use or consume the product, warnings are required to protect
the interests of those reasonably foreseeable users or consumers who would, based on their
own reasonable assessments of the risks and benefits, decline product use or
consumption.”).
158
190 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 1999).
159
Id. at 1219.
160
Id.
161
Id.
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risk so that the user can make an informed decision whether to continue driving the
automobile. 162
The self-determination purpose requires warnings “whenever a reasonable
man would want to be informed of the risk in order to decide whether to expose
himself to it.” 163 It would require disclosure of any risks that are great enough that
a reasonable user would want to be informed of them, enabling that reasonable
user to decide whether the utility of the product justifies exposure to the danger. 164
This purpose requires warnings both at the point of sale 165 and at whatever later
time the manufacturer discovers, or should discover, a substantial danger about
which a reasonable user would want to know.
(c) Lack of Support for a Factually Dependent Post-Sale Duty to Warn
The self-determination principle supports obligating manufacturers to warn of
any post-sale dangers about which a reasonable person would want to know. It
does not, however, support a factually dependent post-sale duty to warn, mainly
162

See id. at 1219–20. This analysis in Watkins is the closest a court has come to
invoking self-determination in adopting a post-sale duty to warn. The Fifth Circuit invoked
self-determination in explaining the reason for a point-of-sale duty to warn under Texas
law. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973). In
interpreting whether Texas law included a post-sale duty to warn, however, the Fifth
Circuit rejected such a duty. See, e.g., McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403,
430 (5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a post-sale duty to warn except in situations where (1) the
manufacturer voluntarily, but negligently, attempts to provide a warning, or (2) the
manufacturer regains control of the product after its initial sale and fails to remedy the
known defect before the subsequent sale); Syrie v. Knoll Int’l, 748 F.2d 304, 311 (5th Cir.
1984) (describing that there is no cause of action in Texas “for a failure to warn about
hazards discovered after a product has been manufactured and sold”).
163
Borel, 493 F.2d at 1089; see also OWEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 9.1, at 514 (“[A]
‘true choice’ situation arises, and a duty to warn attaches, whenever a reasonable man
would want to be informed of the risk in order to decide whether to expose himself to it.”).
164
Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129–30 (9th Cir. 1968) (“When, in a
particular case, the risk qualitatively (e.g., of death or major disability) as well as
quantitatively, on balance with the end sought to be achieved, is such as to call for a true
choice judgment, medical or personal, the warning must be given.”).
165
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 2 cmt. i (“[W]arnings must be provided for
inherent risks that reasonably foreseeable product users and consumers would reasonably
deem material or significant in deciding whether to use or consume the product.”); see also
Edwards v. Hop Sin, Inc., 140 S.W.3d 13, 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003) (“A reasonable
consumer, moreover, expects warnings only against latent risks that are substantial, those
risks sufficiently likely and sufficiently serious to demand attention. The graver the risk, of
course, the less likely it need be to be substantial.”). Substantiality is explicitly relevant to
warnings of potential allergic reactions. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 2 cmt. k
(stating that “a warning is required when the harm-causing ingredient is one to which a
substantial number of persons are allergic” and that “[t]he more severe the harm, the more
justified is a conclusion that the number of persons at risk need not be large to be
considered ‘substantial’”).
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because of its consideration of the costs of warning. Regardless of the cost, the
self-determination principle dictates that the user is entitled to be warned of the
substantial risks. That is one reason why the costs of a point-of-sale warning are
not relevant to whether a user is entitled to warning of the substantial risks. 166
Instead, consistent with the self-determination principle, the extent of the danger
determines whether a warning is required at the point of sale. The factually
dependent post-sale duty considers the costs, however, dictating that no duty is
owed if the costs are burdensome. This consideration is inconsistent with the selfdetermination principle.
The consideration of costs also creates a consequence specifically inconsistent
with the self-determination principle—it creates two categories of users. If the
costs of warning are low, the manufacturer’s customers are entitled to a warning
and to determine their own fate. But if the costs of warning are high, the
manufacturer’s customers are not entitled to a warning or to determine their own
fate. Applied to the reality of the differing costs for small and large manufacturers,
the customers of smaller manufacturers will be entitled to decide their own fate,
but customers of larger manufacturers will not be similarly entitled. The selfdetermination principle rejects any idea of some users being entitled to determine
their own fates, but not others. A customer of a small manufacturer, “no less than
any other product user, has a right to decide whether to expose himself to the
risk.” 167
Moreover, the factors that decide who is entitled to notice under a factually
dependent version of a post-sale duty to warn are irrational. The number of
products sold and the size of the market bear no relationship to whether those
customers are especially in need of information. A user of a sausage-stuffing
machine should be informed about the newly-discovered danger of using the
machine regardless of whether the manufacturer sells dozens or millions of the
machines. The self-determination purpose of warnings would not draw any
distinction based on the user’s entitlement to information, much less a distinction
based on the number of products sold.
4. Deterrence
Another principle behind imposing liability for defective products that injure
plaintiffs is that possible liability should motivate manufacturers to make products
as safe as practicable. 168 Because the product has left the manufacturer’s control,

166

Practically, this is also because the costs are assumed to be negligible. See supra
notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
167
Borel, 493 F.2d at 1106.
168
This was a major motivation behind adopting strict liability as opposed to only
imposing liability for fault (negligence). OWEN ET AL., supra note 15, § 5.4, at 287
(explaining that “raising the standard of liability for manufacturers from negligence to strict
liability will improve product safety”); see also First Nat’l Bank v. Nor-Am Agric. Prods.,
Inc., 537 P.2d 682, 695 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (explaining that imposing strict liability “will
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few ways exist to make a product safer after sale.169 But the manufacturer could
improve safety by issuing a post-sale warning.
It is difficult to evaluate a post-sale duty to warn under the deterrence
rationale. Deterrence was a main motivation for imposing strict liability as opposed
to a mere negligence standard, and imposing liability regardless of fault creates the
strongest incentive to force manufacturers to make products as safe as practicable.
The popularity of strict liability for product defects has diminished, however, and
most do not advocate a post-sale duty to warn based in strict liability. 170
Even negligence-based liability can create some deterrent effect. Both the
point-of-sale and proposed post-sale warning obligations are based in negligence,
meaning a manufacturer can only be liable if at fault. This creates some incentive
to make products as safe as practicable. A negligence-based post-sale warning
obligation creates an incentive to issue the warnings only when the costs of the
warnings are reasonable. If the costs are reasonable, the manufacturers should be
motivated to issue the warning. But a manufacturer has no incentive to issue the
warning if the costs are great, regardless of how much safer the warning would
make the product. If the costs are great, the manufacturer likely would not be
found liable for not issuing a warning, negating any incentive to make its product
safer by issuing the warning.
The point-of-sale warning obligation is also based in negligence, but it creates
a greater incentive to improve the safety of products than the negligence-based
post-sale warning obligation. If the manufacturer knows of a danger at the point of
sale, there is no evaluation of whether to risk not issuing a warning. If a user is hurt
based on that failure to warn, the manufacturer will be liable. But if the
manufacturer learns of a danger after sale, the manufacturer can gamble. If a user
is hurt based on that failure to warn, the manufacturer will not necessarily be liable
because of the costs. 171 The costs of the warning are irrelevant to the point-of-sale
cause manufacturers to take cautionary steps to prevent the marketing of dangerously
defective products”).
169
A manufacturer rarely owes a tort-based duty to recall or retrofit a defective
product. Government agencies, however, may require a recall. Notably, the United States
Consumer Safety Product Commission does not consider the costs of the recall when
determining whether to order it. Instead, it considers the “pattern of defect, the number of
defective products distributed in commerce, and the severity of risk to consumers.” See
Ross, supra note 15, at 354.
170
See, e.g., Richmond, supra note 17, at 30–40 (reviewing nine jurisdictions’
approaches to a post-sale duty to warn).
171
Plus, if the manufacturer did issue the warning, it would be voluntarily assuming
the duty and could face liability if it acted unreasonably within that voluntary warning
campaign. Many states recognize a duty based on its voluntary assumption. See e.g.,
McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 432 (5th Cir. 2001) (imposing post-sale
warning liability when the manufacturer is negligent in its voluntary attempt to provide a
post-sale warning); Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 833 (Minn.
1988) (explaining that the defendant learned that its products were exploding and
voluntarily “undertook a duty to warn of K-rim dangers”). This is consistent with general
tort law that imposes a duty to act reasonably when an actor voluntarily assumes a duty.
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obligation, but almost control the post-sale obligation. The consideration of costs
means a factually dependent post-sale duty does not create the incentive for
product safety that the point-of-sale obligation does, much less the incentive the
deterrence rationale envisions.
5. The Manufacturer’s Ability to Spread the Risk
The basic idea of risk spreading is that a manufacturer is better able to cover
the costs of injuries resulting from defective products because of its ability to
integrate those costs into the price of the product. 172 A broad post-sale duty to warn
would be consistent with this rationale, but a factually dependent post-sale duty to
warn would not.
(a) Explained
California Supreme Court Justice Traynor pointed to this rationale in Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., explaining “the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.” 173
Manufacturers can distribute those costs by increasing the price of their goods. 174
The risk of injury is constant, and “[a]gainst such a risk there should be a general
and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to afford such
protection.” 175
Former Vanderbilt University Law School Dean John W. Wade also pointed
to risk spreading in his contributions to the development of strict liability. He
explained “the manufacturer can more easily obtain appropriate liability insurance
coverage” to cover the costs of injuries and can “spread [the loss] among all the
consumers” “by pricing his product.” 176 In his influential work on defining a defect

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965) (imposing liability for a failure
to exercise reasonable care by “[o]ne who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of
another who is helpless”).
172
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Dangerous Products and Injured Bystanders, 81 KY. L.J.
687, 705–06 (1992–1993); see also Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 823
(N.J. 1981) (“In time, the risk-spreading and cost avoidance measures adverted to above
should become a normal part of business planning in connection with the corporate
acquisition of the assets of a manufacturing enterprise.”).
173
150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
174
See id.
175
Id.; see also Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 917, 952 (1966) (explaining that under the risk-spreading principle, “[t]he
manufacturer is expected to provide for such liability by either purchasing insurance, or by
self-insuring through the creation of a reserve for anticipated losses. The insurance
premium or costs of self-insuring become a manufacturing expense to be passed on to the
ultimate purchaser by means of a rise in prices.”).
176
John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J.
825, 826 (1973). “A different way of expressing essentially the same idea is to say that the
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in strict liability, one of the factors Dean Wade delineated was “[t]he feasibility, on
the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the
product or carrying liability insurance.” 177
As the popularity of strict liability for defective products has diminished, the
popularity of the risk-spreading idea underlying strict liability has also diminished.
Practically, transaction costs preclude the theoretically simple transfer of money
from the increased prices of products to payments to accident victims. “[F]or each
dollar that an accident victim receives in a settlement or judgment, it is reasonable
to assume that a dollar of legal and administrative expenses is incurred.” 178 This is
inefficient and “analogous to a person using an ATM at which a withdrawal of
$100 results in a service fee of $100.” 179 Regardless of this powerful criticism,
courts still sometimes discuss risk spreading, making it appropriate to evaluate
whether risk spreading would support the imposition of any post-sale duty to warn.
(b) Likely Support for a Post-Sale Duty to Warn for All Manufacturers
True, manufacturers generally control the prices of their products and could
increase those prices to cover costs related to warning of later-knowable potential
dangers. Thus, it seems that risk spreading supports the imposition of a post-sale
duty to warn.
At the same time, the danger is unknowable when the manufacturer prices the
product, which could make risk spreading difficult. This is another reason why the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Beshada was heavily criticized. Beshada
held that a manufacturer could be liable for failing to warn of a danger unknowable
at the time of sale. 180 Commentators questioned how a manufacturer could
incorporate the costs of an unknowable injury into the price of a product:
Even if one agrees that risk spreading is a valid goal, however, it is
questionable whether the manufacturer or its insurer is capable of
assessing product risks that are unknowable but nevertheless must be
underwritten at the time the product is sold. The manufacturer’s liability
exposure, then, is potentially uninsurable. Since the cost and potential
loss associated with product risks could not, except on an “open guess
basis,” be included in the price of the product, the likely result would be
overpricing or underpricing the cost of insurance and of the product. 181
activity of making the particular product should pay its own way, that the enterprise should
bear the liability.” Id.
177
Id. at 838.
178
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1470 (2010).
179
Id.
180
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 1982).
181
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 903–04; see also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 13,
at 274–75 (explaining that “manufacturers cannot . . . insure against risks that even
reasonably careful persons do not know exist” and “[l]iability for unknowable risks is a
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The same consequence could occur with post-sale duty to warn liability. The
dangers were unknowable when the product was priced. The cost and potential loss
associated with that later discovered danger could not have been included in the
price of the product. 182 The manufacturer can do little more than speculate, and
“the likely result would be overpricing or underpricing the cost of insurance and of
the product.” 183
There is one difference between liability for a post-sale duty to warn and strict
liability under Beshada—a post-sale warning obligation applies only to dangers
about which the manufacturer learns or should learn. 184 There is no practical way
for a manufacturer to avoid liability under Beshada. A manufacturer could,
however, avoid liability for a failure to issue a post-sale warning. Plainly, a
manufacturer will not be liable for a post-sale failure to warn if it properly issues
an adequate warning of the newly discovered danger.
Still, because of the possible need to issue a post-sale warning, a manufacturer
may want to build into the price of the product something to cover the costs of
issuing that post-sale warning. 185 Again, this could lead to overpricing the product.
weed that should not be allowed to take root in the failure-to-warn garden”); Wertheimer,
supra note 135, at 1239 (“[C]ost spreading will not be possible because the costs of the
injuries are not known in advance, usually where the danger of the product was
unknowable at the time of sale.”); Ellen Wertheimer, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: A
Modest Proposal, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 189, 197 n.29 (1996) (“The cost-spreading
rationale, which requires spreading the costs of injuries before those injuries occur, does
not work particularly well in the context of dangers unknowable at the time of sale because
it is difficult to insure against an unknowable risk, and impossible to spread the costs of an
unknowable danger before that danger materializes.”).
182
See Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for
Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 878 (1983) (“Since the offending products
would already have been priced and sold, their liability costs could not be assigned to
them.”).
183
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 904.
184
Still, a post-sale duty to warn may have a similar effect as a Beshada strict liability
failure to warn claim. A Beshada strict liability failure to warn claim is a way to hold
manufacturers liable for failing to warn of dangers that were unknowable at the time of
sale. See Beshada, 447 A.2d at 549. A post-sale duty to warn is also based on those
unknowable dangers, except it arises at the time when the dangers become knowable (and
the defendant fails to warn of them).
185
Even if the manufacturer plans to continue to research its product and to issue any
warnings that may become necessary, there is no guarantee that actually issuing a warning
will mean the defendant is not liable—the plaintiff can still allege that the warning given
was inadequate. See Smith v. Ontario Sewing Mach. Co., 548 S.E.2d 89, 96 (Ga. Ct. App.
2001) (“A post-sale warning must be adequate and specific to satisfy the manufacturerseller’s duty to the ultimate user to protect from harm; a vague or generalized warning that
fails to warn of the specific defect, the danger from the defect, and remediation is not an
adequate warning.”), vacated, 576 S.E.2d 38 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). In a recent case pending
in Alaska, a manufacturer of a facial moisturizer issued a post-sale warning after it
discovered that its moisturizer may have contained a “very low level of common bacteria.”
Blake v. Guthy-Renker, LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1079 (D. Alaska 2013). The plaintiff
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Because of the ability to avoid liability, the same impossibility of risk spreading in
Beshada does not apply to a post-sale duty to warn. A broad post-sale duty to
warn, then, is likely consistent with products liability’s underlying risk-spreading
rationale.
(c) Lack of Support for a Factually Dependent Post-Sale Duty
A factually dependent post-sale duty is, however, inconsistent with risk
spreading because it obligates some manufacturers to warn but not others. The
risk-spreading rationale does not recognize any distinctions among which
manufacturers should be obligated and which should not.
Although Dean Wade listed the ability of the manufacturer to spread the risk
as a factor relevant to whether a defect exists, he did not believe liability should
depend on whether the particular defendant had the ability to spread the risk. 186 In
fact, Dean Wade did not believe this factor should even be mentioned to the
jury. 187 Courts agree. To imply “defendants should be held liable because they had
the ability to spread the loss for injuries among all the users of the product by
setting the price of the product or by carrying liability insurance” is “simply . . .
not the law.” 188 Just as a specific defendant’s ability to spread the risk is not
relevant, a defendant’s specific inability to spread the risk is not relevant.
Instead, the risk-spreading rationale ignores the practical differences between
manufacturers and assumes that all defendants can spread the risk and should be
liable for injuries resulting from defective products. 189 Even small manufacturers
that lack the practical ability to raise prices because it will hurt their ability to
compete are assumed to be able to spread the risk. 190 Thus, even if the riskspreading rationale would support a broad post-sale duty to warn, it would not
alleges, however, that this warning was inadequate and thus the manufacturer breached its
duty to issue a post-sale warning. Id. at 1079–80.
186
See Wade, supra note 176, at 837–838, 840.
187
Id. at 840.
188
Fiorino v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 707 A.2d 1053, 1057 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998).
189
See Note, supra note 175, at 952 (distinguishing risk spreading from “a lossbearing or ‘deep-pocket’ justification which would make liability dependent upon whether
the manufacturer or injured purchaser can better afford the loss”).
190
Courts have considered the inability to spread the risk when declining to adopt
successor liability. See Malloy v. Doty Conveyor, 820 F. Supp. 217, 220 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(declining to find an installer company strictly liable because it was not within the chain of
distribution and was thus unable to “control the defect and spread its costs through
pricing”); Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1111
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (finding it problematic whether successors, especially small
entrepreneurs, can spread the costs); Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 958 A.2d 498, 506 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2008) (finding that successors can be liable if it is shown that the successor had
the “ability to assume the original manufacturer’s risk-spreading role [sic]” (quoting
Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 109 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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support a particularized factual version that would obligate some manufacturers
but not others depending on their financial circumstances.
B. Inconsistent with Public Policy—Crippling Small Manufacturers
A factually dependent post-sale duty to warn is contrary to public policy
because of its practical, economic consequences for small manufacturers—
consequences that large manufacturers will not share. Small manufacturers are
already disproportionately affected by products liability law. They are the least
able to adjust prices to cover the costs of liability or products liability insurance.
Imposing a factually dependent duty will only exacerbate these disproportionate
effects. Small manufacturers will now face even higher products liability insurance
costs, research costs, and actual warning costs.
Courts specifically reject another products liability law due to concern for its
adverse effect on small manufacturers. That law is a product-line exception, which
would make successor companies strictly liable for products sold by the
predecessor company if the successor continued the product line. Because of the
potential effects on small manufacturers, many courts reject this product-line
exception. Courts should follow this reasoning and similarly reject a factually
dependent post-sale duty to warn.
1. The Already Vulnerable State of Small Manufacturers
Commentators pointed out a possible disproportionate effect on small
manufacturers when courts first adopted strict liability for injuries caused by
defective products. Because of various “economic factors[,] it may often be a
matter of pure chance as to whether a given manufacturer or industry can adjust its
price structure to absorb a new cost thrust upon it.” 191 Moreover, even if price
adjustments are possible, “there will always be uninsured defendants, there will
191

Marcus L. Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects
in Products—An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938, 947 (1957). Professor Plant also
argued:
Is it sound to assume that manufacturers in general are in a position to
distribute the risk of all product injuries through the price mechanism? There is
substantial reason to doubt that such a generalization is valid as to all industries
or for all manufacturers in a specific industry. . . . For example, certain products
are subject to what economists call an “elastic demand,” i.e., a slight increase in
price will cause a sharp reduction in demand or will turn consumers to a
substitute product. In such industries the product’s price is by no means as
adjustable as is assumed by the proponents of strict liability.
Id. at 946–47. But see George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 504
(1985) (labeling Plant’s criticisms as “hardly compelling and amount[ing] to little more
than veneration of the status quo”).
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always be liability in excess of coverage, and there will be members of the group
whose competitive situation does not permit them to pass on the cost of the
insurance to their customers.” 192
For a small business, “an increase may mean pricing [itself] out of the
market.” 193 True, some manufacturers are easily able to pass on costs, “[b]ut many
manufacturers are in a totally different situation. Their position in the industry is
vulnerable and their competitive situation delicate. It is these comparatively small
manufacturers who suffer when additional costs are added without regard to their
situation.” 194 The New Hampshire Supreme Court expressed a similar concern:
“The ‘Fortune 500’ companies suffer less economically because they can develop
adequate statistics, purchase insurance, and employ expensive experts and legal
counsel. For thousands of small manufacturers, the high cost of self-protection or
insurance can be prohibitive so as to force them out of business.” 195
Studies have shown that the increasing cost of products liability insurance has
affected small manufacturers. In 1976, a Federal Interagency Task Force found the
costs of product liability insurance had greatly increased, and the “increase
appeared to have been greater for small, as compared to large, businesses.” 196
Aside from simply being able to afford insurance or spread the costs by increasing
the prices of products, “[s]mall businesses are less able to bargain effectively for
favorable insurance rates.” 197 A large manufacturer can adapt to retain coverage by

192

William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1121 (1960).
193
Plant, supra note 191, at 947.
194
Id.
195
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978).
196
Victor E. Schwartz, The Uniform Product Liability Act—A Brief Overview, 33
VAND. L. REV. 579, 580 (1980); see also Robert A. Van Kirk, Note, The Evolution of
Useful Life Statutes in the Products Liability Reform Effort, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1689, 1689–90
(“Insurance companies insisted that the drastic rise in both claims and awards necessitated
increases in premiums that many small manufacturers found unaffordable.”). The
Interagency Task Force made the following “key conclusions about the nature and causes
of the problem” of increasing costs of products liability insurance:
1. Although the cost of product liability insurance has increased
substantially in most industries, the problem of increasing costs is severe in only
a few industries, such as industrial machinery, industrial chemicals, automotive
components, and pharmaceuticals.
2. The problem of availability and affordability of product liability
insurance is concentrated in the small firms in those industries.
1 INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF THE INSURANCE STUDY ES-7 (1977) [hereinafter
Task Force].
197
Glenn J. Waldrip, Jr., Comment, Limiting Liability: Products Liability and a
Statute of Repose, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 137, 139 (1980). The Comment also explains that
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assuming a large deductible or accepting a differently rated plan. “For the smaller
firm, particularly the single-product firm, these adaptations are not as feasible. The
account is not large enough for its own experience to have credibility for the
insurer, and it does not have the financial resources to share a significant
proportion of the risk burden itself.” 198
Congress has addressed this problem numerous times. In a 1992 committee
hearing, a Congressman explained that “[t]here is no doubt that the costs and
perceived inefficiencies of our product liability system are of great concern to the
small business community.” 199 He further explained that “the cost and availability
of liability insurance was one of the three chief concerns of small businesses in
[his] home state of Virginia” and that reports demonstrating how the “costs of our
product liability system fall disproportionately on small businesses are very
troubling,” particularly since “[m]any have concluded that the liability insurance
crisis is especially severe for small businesses, in terms of both the cost and the
availability of insurance.” 200 At the same hearing, Professor Kip Viscusi also
testified that the changes in liability insurance premiums “create particular
problems for small firms.” 201 Those small firms that are unable to self-insure tend
to “have a less diversified product line so that any particular design defect case will
tend to hit them harder,” and they “lack some of the economies of scale with
respect to litigation that larger firms have.” 202
Other committee hearings have focused on the effects of products liability law
on small manufacturers. As examples, in 1999, a Congressman explained at a
hearing that the burden of the tort system on “small business defendants is
magnified. The smallest of businesses are more likely to be uninsured or
underinsured, which means that one lawsuit puts their economic survival at

the problems associated with obtaining liability insurance are amplified for small
manufacturers selling machinery that will be used for many years:
For small firms that manufacture nothing but long-life products such as
industrial machinery, the problem is especially acute. Many of these firms have
exposures that may amount to 10 to 20 times the current year’s production—i.e.
machines now in use that were sold over many years’ time. Thus, in developing
a rate to be applied to the current year’s sales, the insurer must multiply the loss
potential per machine 10 to 20 times.
Id. at 139–40 (quoting TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at ES-5).
198
TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at ES-5.
199
Impact of the Product Liability System on Small Business: J. Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on SBA, the Gen. Econ., & Minority Enter. Dev. & the Subcomm. on Exps., Tax
Policy, & Spec. Problems of the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 102d Cong. 46 (1992) (statement
of Hon. Norman Sisisky, Chairman, Subcomm. on Exports, Tax Policy, and Special
Problems).
200
Id.
201
Id. at 119 (statement of Professor W. Kip Viscusi).
202
Id. at 119–20.
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risk . . . .” 203 A witness testified that “being sued is one of the most terrifying
experiences a small business owner can have.” 204 In a 2004 hearing, panelists
described the costs of liability insurance for small manufacturers and the fact that
some small manufacturers could not afford it and had to pay litigation costs out of
pocket. 205 In 2007, a witness explained to a congressional committee that even
small settlements can be damaging to a small business: “When you consider that
many small businesses gross $350,000 or less a year, which does not include
additional expenses of running the business, like payroll, rent, costs of goods sold,
and regulatory costs, $5 to $10,000 can significantly impact a small business
owner’s bottom line.” 206 Plus, any settlement, even if small, can drive up insurance
premium rates. 207
Congress has introduced numerous bills purporting to protect small
manufacturers. 208 The most prominent was the Common Sense Product Liability
203

Small Business Liability Reform Act of 1999: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 7 (1999).
204
Id. at 96–97 (statement by Roger R. Geiger, State Exec. Director, National
Federation of Independent Business) (“It is even more frightening for the smallest of small
businesses who fear being put out of business for good with one lawsuit. . . . More than half
of Ohio’s small businesses have had to raise the cost of products and services because of
liability concerns—a cost we as consumers have to pay.”).
205
See Small Business Liability Reform: Hearing on H.R. 2813 Before the Subcomm.
on Regulatory Reform and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 108th Cong. 29–30
(2004) (statement of Lisa Rickard, President, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform)
(“Very small businesses—those with less than $1 million in annual revenues—pay $33
billion of the $88 billion per year. That works out to about $17,000 each per year. What’s
even more astonishing is that these very small businesses pay 44%, or $15 billion, of their
liability costs out-of-pocket—not through insurance coverage.”); see also id. at 41
(statement of Jo Rae Wager, President, CTO, Inc.) (“[S]imply, many contracting firms
can’t afford triple-digit increases in their general liability premiums, that is, if they’re lucky
enough to find coverage. Often these increases come to companies that have not even had a
claim; it’s simply the nature of the industry.”).
206
Full Committee Hearing on Liability Reform and Small Business: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 110th Cong. 8 (2007) (statement of Karen R. Harned,
Executive Director, National Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation).
207
Id. at 55.
208
See, e.g., Product Liability Reform Act of 1998, S. 2236, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(3)
(1998) (proposing nationwide product liability standards and damage limitations, in part,
because “product liability awards can jeopardize the financial well-being of individuals and
industries, particularly the Nation’s small businesses”); Product Liability Reform Act of
1997, S. 648, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (1997) (proposing nationwide product liability
standards and damage limitations, in part, because “excessive, unpredictable, and often
arbitrary damage awards and unfair allocations of liability jeopardize the financial wellbeing of many individuals as well as entire industries, particularly the Nation’s small
businesses”); Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 5, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (1997)
(proposing nationwide product liability standards and damage limitations, in part, because
“excessive, unpredictable, and often arbitrary damage awards and unfair allocations of
liability jeopardize the financial well-being of many individuals as well as entire industries,
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Legal Reform Act of 1996, which contained tort reform measures benefitting both
small and large manufacturers generally and had bipartisan support in both the
United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate. 209 Despite
ultimately passing both Houses, President Clinton vetoed it. 210
2. Additional Costs to Small Manufacturers from the Post-Sale Duty
Because a factually dependent post-sale duty to warn is likely to apply to
small manufacturers, small manufacturers will likely incur additional costs related
to insurance, research, and issuing post-sale warnings.
(a) Products Liability Insurance
Generally speaking, “[t]he insurance mechanism . . . works best when losses
for a class of risks over a period of time are reasonably predictable.” 211 Premiums
can then be set based on those expected risks; ideally, “premiums are set so as to
exactly relate to the level of risk that the insured’s own conduct occasions.” 212
particularly the Nation’s small businesses”); Common Sense Product Liability Legal
Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (1996) (explaining that “excessive,
unpredictable, and often arbitrary damage awards and unfair allocations of liability
jeopardize the financial well-being of many individuals as well as entire industries,
particularly the Nation’s small businesses”); Common Sense Product Liability Legal
Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 1075, 104th Cong. §§ 101(a)(6) & (b) (1995) (proposing
nationwide product liability standards, in part, because “product liability actions and
punitive damage awards jeopardize the financial well-being of many industries and are a
particular threat to the viability of the nation’s small businesses”); see also, e.g., Small
Business Liability Reform Act of 2003, S. 1546, 108th Cong. (2003) (reintroduction of
Senate Bill 865); Small Business Liability Reform Act of 2003, H.R. 2813, 108th Cong.
(2003) (House Companion Bill to S. 1546); Small Business Liability Reform Act of 2001,
S. 865, 107th Cong. (2001) (essentially a reintroduction of S. 1185); Small Business
Liability Reform Act of 2001, H.R. 1805, 107th Cong. (2001) (House Companion Bill to S.
865); Small Manufacturer Liability Reform Act of 1999, S. 1185, 106th Cong. (1999);
Small Business Liability Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 2366, 106th Cong. (1999). The House,
but not the Senate, ultimately passed House Bill 2366 as the Small Business Liability
Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 2366, 106th Cong. (2000).
209
H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996).
210
See generally H.R. DOC. NO. 104-207 (1996) (message from the President vetoing
House Bill 956). President Clinton explained that he vetoed the bill because it “tilts the
playing field against consumers” and “inappropriately intrudes on state authority.” Neil A.
Lewis, President Vetoes Limits on Liability, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at A22.
211
TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at 1-1.
212
Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 313, 320 (1990); see also Isaac Montal, Note, The Consumer
Expectations Test in New Jersey: What Can Consumers Expect Now?, 54 BROOK. L. REV.
1381, 1394 (1989) (summarizing insurance industry representatives’ testimony explaining
the causes of a products liability “insurance crisis,” including that “premiums are based on
the probability of having to satisfy and defend future claims” but that probability is difficult

1056

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

The level of risk that a manufacturer’s own conduct occasions now includes
possible liability for a failure to issue a post-sale warning. This is a new form of
liability for manufacturers. When liability, a loss-producing factor, changes,
“insurers must respond judgmentally by adjusting their rates to reflect these
changing loss-producing factors.” 213 Rationally then, insurers may need to increase
premiums.
Insurers, however, do not need to increase premiums for large manufacturers.
The level of risk that a large manufacturer’s own conduct occasions would likely
not include losses due to liability for a post-sale duty to warn. Because the duty is
factually dependent on the costs of the warning, it is not likely that a large
manufacturer will owe a duty to warn. It is also not likely that a large manufacturer
would incur any losses related to a post-sale warning duty.
Small manufacturers, unlike large manufacturers, are likely to owe a post-sale
warning duty. Thus, small manufacturers are also likely to incur losses related to a
post-sale warning duty. Rationally then, insurers should increase the premiums for
the policies of small manufacturers, but not large manufacturers, because of the
post-sale obligation.
The question is how much insurers should increase the premiums for small
manufacturers. Insurers already have difficulty setting premiums for products
liability insurance policies because “it is difficult to estimate future losses with any
degree of accuracy.” 214 This is especially true because whether a loss is covered
depends on whether it arose from an occurrence during the policy period. 215 “[I]t
to determine); Waldrip, supra note 197, at 141 (“[D]ecisions concerning both the issuance
and cost of policies are made by combining an actuarial analysis of loss experience with
judgmental determinations . . . .”). Professor Schwartz explains that products liability
insurers use both schedule rating and experience rating to set premiums. Schedule rating
includes adjustments to premiums based on “information yielded by an inspection or
survey of the insured’s operations.” Schwartz, supra, at 320. Premiums may thus be
adjusted based on precautions the manufacturer takes in designing or manufacturing
products. Id. Experience rating looks to the insured’s history of claims as a proxy for future
risk. Id.
Insurers also consider the number of products sold when determining premiums. Id. at
318 n.21 (explaining that the “premiums for products liability insurance are calculated as a
predetermined percentage of dollars of sales,” meaning the “premium [is] a direct function
of the number of products sold”). Thus, the insurance premiums for small manufacturers
with fewer customers should be smaller than the premiums for large manufacturers.
Despite this, studies have shown that small manufacturers still have a more difficult time
obtaining and affording liability insurance. See supra notes 196–198 and accompanying
text.
213
TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at 1-5. The Report explains that insurers must adjust
their rates “when new legal precedents limit defenses.” Id.
214
Waldrip, supra note 197, at 141; see also TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at 1-2
(explaining that “[m]ost companies also require a survey by a loss control specialist before
writing liability coverage for products they consider particularly risky”).
215
In the typical products liability policy, the insurer agrees to defend and pay “all
sums that [the insured] will become legally obligated to pay as damages arising out of an
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does not matter when the product was manufactured or sold, or whether it existed
at the time the insurer underwrote the policy.” 216 This aspect of coverage—that the
insurance could cover injuries caused by products sold years before—“has been
cited as the cause of severe problems.” 217 The most difficult problem is that “[t]he
underwriter is faced with the possibility that any one of the insured’s existing
products, including products manufactured over 20 years ago, could cause a loss
under the current policy.” 218
This inability to predict the losses “is, according to most insurers, a major
obstacle to underwriting decisions.” 219 Simply because there is no other way to set
rates, “[r]ates for product liability insurance are based largely or, for some
products, entirely on nonstatistically derived, judgmental estimates of loss
frequency and severity.” 220
The difficulty of setting fair premiums will only increase as insurers begin to
contemplate losses due to post-sale warnings. A post-sale duty to warn arises when
a manufacturer learns (or should learn) of a danger after selling the product.
Whether that danger will materialize is, almost by definition, an uncertainty. The
severity of that unknown danger, and the resulting loss, is also uncertain.
Plus, the danger could materialize two weeks after sale, or twenty years after
sale. 221 The uncertainty of potential point-of-sale liability arising “from old
occurrence or loss event causing bodily injury or property damage.” TASK FORCE, supra
note 196, at 1-14.
216
Id.; see also Waldrip, supra note 197, at 141 (explaining that the insurer can
become legally obligated to pay damages resulting from products sold before the policy
was in place).
217
TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at 1-14.
218
Id. at 1-15; Waldrip, supra note 197, at 141–42 (explaining that difficulty of
determining premiums increases because insurers are “forced to set their present premiums
at a level sufficient to satisfy potential claims arising from old products that are or could be
still in use”).
219
TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at 1-20.
220
Id. at 1-40; see also Laurie L. Kratky, Statutes of Repose in Products Liability:
Death Before Conception?, 37 SW. L.J. 665, 676 (1983) (explaining that the “increasing
number and average dollar amount of products liability claims and awards” combined with
the “highly subjective methods of insurance rate-making” have contributed to a dramatic
increase in the premiums of products liability policies); Waldrip, supra note 197, at 141–
42.
Two types of rates exist for the basic limits of a policy. Manual rates are derived from
data that insurance companies have submitted to the Insurance Services Office regarding
premiums, losses, and exposures. TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at 1-36. This data is then
analyzed actuarially. Id. Even though this “basic rate is based on aggregate experience,
some judgment may be involved in selecting the appropriate classification.” Id. at 1-38. If
insufficient data exists to calculate a rate through actuarial techniques, a “(a) rate” is
determined based “primarily on judgment.” Id. at 1-36. This judgment based (a) rate is also
often used to determine premiums when insurance policy limits exceed $300,000 for bodily
injury and $50,000 or $100,000 for property damage. Id. at 1-37.
221
A statute of repose could cut off the possibility of liability at some point if the state
legislature has adopted one. Madden, supra note 24, at 38–39 (“It would . . . seem to follow
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products that are or could be still in use . . . contributed to liability premiums
increases of over one thousand percent for some manufacturers.” 222 Liability for
the post-sale warning obligation is, almost by definition, based on old products that
are or could still be in use that were, or should have been, discovered to be
dangerous. True, the passage of time may make a factually dependent post-sale
duty to warn less likely to exist, as even a small manufacturer may have difficulty
identifying users after a long passage of time. 223 But the passage of time is not
determinative, meaning liability is still possible, causing even more uncertainty in
the estimation of future losses.
There is little doubt that post-sale warning liability will cause substantial
uncertainty about a small manufacturer’s potential losses. If any substantial
uncertainty exists, the underwriter is forced “to be very cautious, which, in turn,
affects the cost and availability of insurance.” 224 Really, the insurer has only two
options—either not issue the insurance policy, or set the “premiums high enough
to prepare for the worst possibilities.” 225 Either consequence is enough to drive the
manufacturer needing the insurance out of business. Without insurance, the small
manufacturer likely would be unable to survive even one judgment. With
insurance, the small manufacturer would be unlikely to afford the premiums and
yet continue in business.
Small manufacturers need to obtain products liability insurance to cover the
risk of loss resulting from a post-sale warning because they (and not large
that upon exhaustion of an applicable state repose period, a seller’s potential liability for
any post-sale warning or other product-related obligation would likewise cease.”).
222
Waldrip, supra note 197, at 142; see also TASK FORCE, supra note 196, at ES-7
(explaining that one factor contributing to “increasing claim costs” is “a manufacturer’s
liability for products made years ago”); Kratky, supra note 220, at 676 (“[T]he uncertainty
associated with products that have been in use for many years . . . caused many insurers to
engage in ‘panic-pricing.’ Unknown liability for an equally unknown number of years has
led to a worst-case type of analysis.”).
223
Hanlan v. Chandler, No. 4-0259B, 2008 WL 5608253, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Nov. 13, 2008) (finding no post-sale duty to warn under the Third Restatement because
“the crane accident occurred about thirty years after [the manufacturer] first sold the crane”
and “[t]he crane changed hands at least three times in those thirty years,” precluding the
ability of the manufacturer to identify those needing to be warned).
224
Waldrip, supra note 197, at 141.
225
Id. at 142; see also Kratky, supra note 220, at 676 (explaining that as a result of
the uncertainty of future losses, “many insurers have either refused to issue products
liability policies altogether or have set premiums so high as to make them effectively
unavailable”). True, small manufacturers can avoid liability by actually issuing the postsale warning, reducing the chance that the insured manufacturer will incur losses. From the
insurer’s perspective, however, there is no guarantee that the small manufacturer will
actually issue the warning. Plus, if the ability to avoid liability was a reason to not insure a
risk, then an insurer would also not insure losses related to liability for point-of-sale
warning obligations. Even though a manufacturer will not be liable if it warns of dangers it
knows of or should know of, manufacturers still obtain and insurers still issue insurance for
losses caused by liability for a point-of-sale warning.
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manufacturers) are most likely to face liability related to a post-sale warning.
Small manufacturers are also, however, the manufacturers already most likely
unable to afford the costs of products liability insurance. And the cost of that
insurance is only likely to increase as more jurisdictions adopt a post-sale warning
obligation.
(b) Research
Other potentially expensive costs also exist. Mainly, this includes costs
associated with ongoing research regarding possible dangers hidden in products. A
factually dependent post-sale duty does not expressly obligate a manufacturer to
research its products after sale. It does, however, make the manufacturer liable if it
fails to warn of dangers about which it should have known. The dangers about
which it should have known are the dangers that ongoing research would have
revealed. 226 Thus, to avoid liability for a failure to issue a post-sale warning, a
small manufacturer will need to continue to research the dangers of its products. 227
This research could be very expensive. 228 Small manufacturers will be forced to
incur the costs of this continuing research, but large manufacturers will not.
(c) Costs of Actually Issuing the Post-Sale Warning
If the obligation to issue a post-sale warning exists under the factually
dependent version of the duty, the costs of actually issuing that warning are
reasonable. Even if reasonable though, there are still costs associated with issuing
the warning. The costs include expenses related to the logistics of issuing the
warning itself—producing the post-sale warning itself and communicating that
warning to the manufacturer’s customers.
If these costs are extensive and unreasonable, as they likely will be for a
larger manufacturer, a manufacturer will not have to incur them because it will not
be obligated to issue the post-sale warning. But if the costs are reasonable, as they
likely will be for a smaller manufacturer, the small manufacturer will have to incur
226

See Richter v. Limax Int’l, Inc., 45 F.3d 1464, 1470–71 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming
jury’s verdict finding liability for a failure to warn that jogging on a trampoline could cause
stress fractures because plaintiff’s evidence showed that reasonable tests would have
revealed that foreseeable danger).
227
See Ross, supra note 15, at 345 (explaining how a post-sale duty to warn “may
require manufacturers to investigate when reasonable grounds exist for the seller to suspect
that a hitherto unknown risk exists”); see also Kenneth Ross & J. David Prince, Post-Sale
Duties: The Most Expansive Theory in Products Liability, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 963, 969
(2009) (“The language in section 10 could be used to argue that the scope of other
manufacturers’ and suppliers’ legal duties are extended by requiring reasonable affirmative
actions to learn of post-sale product risks.”).
228
See Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1528–29 (D. Minn. 1989)
(discussing limiting a post-sale duty to situations where the manufacturer knows of the
danger to alleviate the potentially “crushing burden on manufacturers to retest products”).
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them and issue the warning. Thus, a small manufacturer will likely have to spend
money issuing post-sale warnings, but a larger manufacturer likely will not.
3. Courts’ Concern for Small Manufacturers as the Main Reason to Reject the
Product-Line Exception
Potentially devastating economic consequences for small manufacturers—the
same consequences that could very well result from the imposition of a factually
dependent post-sale duty to warn—are the very reason that numerous courts have
rejected another specific products liability law. That law is a product-line
exception to the general rule that a successor company cannot be strictly liable for
products manufactured and sold by the predecessor corporation. 229 The productline exception would impose strict liability on the successor if it “continues the
output” of the line of products. 230
The Florida Supreme Court rejected the product-line exception “due in part to
the threat of economic annihilation that small businesses would face under such a
rule of expanded liability. Because of their limited assets, small corporations
would face financial destruction from imposition of liability for their predecessor’s
products.” 231
An Illinois court also rejected the exception because of small manufacturers’
inability to obtain insurance:
Recent studies indicate that many manufacturers, and in particular small
manufacturers, have a difficult problem obtaining products liability
insurance and find it impossible to cover the risks by raising prices
because they have to compete with larger manufacturers who can keep
the price down. . . . Additionally, it is one thing to assume that a
manufacturer can acquire insurance against potential liability for its own
products and another to assume it can acquire such insurance for the
products made by a different manufacturer. We do not know whether
insurance companies will readily provide such insurance. We cannot
assume it as fact. 232
Numerous other state courts have agreed. 233 Courts are concerned about how
this rule, obligating all successor manufacturers, would affect small manufacturers.
229

See Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1982).
Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977).
231
Bernard, 409 So. 2d at 1049.
232
Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1111 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1982).
233
Johnston v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Colo. App. 1992)
(expressly rejecting the product-line exception and citing concern for small manufacturer
as a motivating rationale); Guzman v. MRM/Elgin, 567 N.E.2d 929, 932–33 (Mass. 1991)
(same); Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 99–100 (Minn. 1989) (same);
Simoneau v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407, 409 (N.H. 1988) (same); Semenetz v.
230
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Courts should similarly be concerned with how a factually dependent post-sale
duty, which possibly will apply only to small manufacturers, would affect those
manufacturers.
V. CONCLUSION
One would not expect too many complaints about a law that imposes
obligations only if those obligations are reasonable. How could a law be unfair or
problematic if it imposes liability only if conduct is unreasonable?

Sherling & Walden, Inc., 851 N.E.2d 1170, 1173–75 (N.Y. 2006) (same); Downtowner,
Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 122–25 (N.D. 1984) (same); Simmons v.
Mark Lift Indus., Inc., 622 S.E.2d 213, 215 (S.C. 2005) (same); Griggs v. Capitol Mach.
Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287, 294 n.5 (Tex. App. 1985) (same); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool
Corp., 479 A.2d 126, 127 (Vt. 1984) (same); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820,
825–29 (Wis. 1985) (same); see also Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 570 (Md. 1991)
(rejecting the continuity of enterprise exception finding successor liability because “not
only would liability be imposed upon ‘a major corporation,’ but it would also be imposed
upon the small business operation which may not be in a position to spread the risk or
insure against it”); Debra Ann Schiff, Products Liability and Successor Corporations:
Protecting the Product User and the Small Manufacturer Through Increased Availability
of Products Liability Insurance, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1000, 1003–04 (1980) (noting that
most small companies are unable to obtain policies covering liability for injuries caused by
a predecessor’s products). But see Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 822–23
(N.J. 1981) (recognizing “legitimate concerns” for small manufacturers that arise as a
consequence of adopting the product-line exception, but concluding that such “concerns,
genuine as they may be, cannot be permitted to overshadow the basic social policy, now so
well-entrenched in [New Jersey] jurisprudence, that favors imposition of the costs of
injuries from defective products on the manufacturing enterprise and consuming public
rather than on the innocent injured party”); Sullivan v. A.W. Flint Co., No. CV 920339263,
1996 WL 469716 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1996) (same); Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933
P.2d 243, 249–50 (N.M. 1997) (same); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 604 (Wash.
1984) (same).
The Massachusetts Supreme Court described this “very real threat” to small
manufacturers as an “issue[] of broad public policy involving balancing the interests of
future plaintiffs and defendants, which the Legislature is better equipped to resolve.”
Guzman, 567 N.E.2d at 932–33. Two state courts that rejected a post-sale duty also noted
that the issue should be resolved by the legislature instead of a court. Campbell v. Gala
Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A.6:04-2036-RBH, 2006 WL 1073796, at *5 (D.S.C. Apr. 20, 2006)
(refusing to “legislate from the bench”); Palmer v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 905 So. 2d
564, 601 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (refusing to recognize a post-sale duty to warn “in the
absence of legislative action”). Those courts did not cite the consequences to small
manufacturers as a reason for the legislature being better equipped to resolve the existence
of a post-sale duty to warn. But if the legislature is best equipped to evaluate the potential
consequences to small manufacturers that will result from the product-line exception, it
may similarly be best equipped to evaluate the consequences to small manufacturers that
will result from a factually dependent post-sale duty to warn.
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But what is reasonable for one manufacturer may not be reasonable for
another depending on the manufacturer’s circumstances. If a manufacturer has
only a few customers, it is reasonable to obligate that manufacturer to contact those
few customers to warn them. But if a manufacturer has thousands of customers,
such an obligation would likely not be reasonable because of its expense. Because
of the cost, it is reasonable for the large manufacturer to not warn.
Unintentionally, a factually dependent post-sale duty to warn creates a
scenario where small manufacturers are more likely than large manufacturers to
owe a duty to warn after the sale and be liable if they breach that duty. Further, it
creates a scenario where customers of small manufacturers are more likely to
receive and benefit from a post-sale warning, whereas customers of large
manufacturers will be left without that safety benefit:
Is it credible to have a body of law that permits a cause of action for a
person who suffers serious burns when his custom-made suit, made of
readily flammable material, catches fire, whereas the person who suffers
identical injuries from a department-store suit made of the same material
recovers nothing? 234
The obvious answer is no. But that is exactly what a factually dependent postsale duty does. It is also exactly why courts should not adopt a factually dependent
post-sale duty to warn.
Essentially, courts are left with only two options in adopting or modifying a
post-sale warning obligation: obligate all manufacturers regardless of the costs, or
reject any post-sale duty to warn because the costs of warning are too burdensome.
The first option is unlikely given the widespread belief that a post-sale duty to
warn would be very burdensome on manufacturers. The solution to that burden is
not to adopt a duty that would exist only if the costs are reasonable—that factually
dependent duty is more likely to obligate small manufacturers than large
manufacturers. Instead, the solution to that burden is to reject any post-sale duty to
warn.

234

John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products
Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919,
1942 (2010). Professors Goldberg and Zipursky made this point in response to an argument
made by Professors A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell. Polinsky & Shavell, supra
note 178, at 1452. Generally, Professors Polinsky and Shavell argued the costs of liability
outweighed the benefits in improving product safety, especially when other mechanisms
exist to improve product safety—mainly government regulation and the market. See id. at
1452. They admitted, however, that the conclusion applies better to widely sold products.
Id. Professors Goldberg and Zipursky questioned the legitimacy of a products liability
system that would apply to small manufacturers, but not large ones. See Goldberg &
Zipursky, supra, at 1942. The point applies equally as well to a factually dependent postsale duty to warn.

